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Executive summary 
 
Background 
This paper aims to bring together the global evidence on paying providers for performance (P4P), its 
impact on the delivery of sexual and reproductive health services, and the conditions under which it 
may have been effective. It is based on a literature review carried out in November-December 2011, 
with some updating in 2013. It synthesises evidence from policies and projects which have been 
documented and published to date. The sources include the few available published impact 
evaluations as well as the more extensive internal reports focussing on early implementation 
experiences. It focuses on supply-side measures, and complements a recent report on demand-side 
financing for SHR services in low and middle-income countries. 
 
Definitions, modalities, goals and risks 
P4P refers to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or 
achieving a predetermined performance target. It goes by a number of different names and has a 
range of modalities, including different levels of payment (to governments, local governments, 
NGOs, facilities and individual health workers) and combinations of these levels, different targeted 
outcomes, payment systems and magnitude of transfers. 
 
While in higher income countries, P4P has been to a large extent aimed at improving quality of care, 
in LMICs, the objectives have been wider, including to increase the allocative efficiency of health 
services (by encouraging the provision of high priority and cost effective services); to increase their 
technical efficiency (by making better use of existing resources such as health staff); and to improve 
equity of outcomes (for example, by encouraging expansion of services to hard-to-reach groups). 
Some have also argued that P4P has the potential to transform health systems. 
 
However, P4P relies on a set of assumptions, which may be more or less accurate for specific 
contexts, and also poses potentially serious risks. These need careful monitoring and management. 
They include: 
• distortion – encouraging health staff to ignore important services which are not rewarded with 
incentives, including untargeted services and more complex dimensions of performance 
• cherry-picking – focussing health workers on services which provide greatest gain with least 
effort over others which may be as or more important; this may also increase inequity in some 
cases (where poorer populations are harder to reach, for example) 
• gaming - improving or cheating on reporting rather than improving performance 
• financial dependency – problematic if PBF is not sustained and has caused raised expectations 
from staff 
• inefficiency – high operating costs and low returns may make this a poor investment 
• fiduciary risks – if funds are poorly controlled, then leakage and corruption may be increased 
• coercion – if clients are pressured to accept a service or undergo a procedure to increase 
provider rewards 
• undermining intrinsic motivation of staff, and cooperative behaviour between staff 
Analysis of policies and projects 
P4P has spread quickly in the health sector in low- and middle-income countries over the past 
decade. It has been deployed in relation to two groups of services in particular – control of infectious 
diseases and sexual, reproductive and child health services. More than twenty countries are now 
applying P4P in some form. Details are presented on 25 documented case studies, covering Latin 
America, Asia and Africa, including two global health initiatives; two cases of performance-based 
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contracting of local authorities and seven of NGOs; nine examples of PBF directed mainly at health 
facilities; and five examples focussed on individual health worker incentive payments.  
 
However, the literature on P4P remains limited. While there are many reports written by designers 
and implementers of P4P programmes, there are few independent evaluations using robust study 
design. A recent systematic review of the topic has highlighted a number of areas of concern in 
relation to the quality of evidence. Further work is now underway to generate more impact 
evaluation evidence in 16 countries. 
 
A conceptual framework is developed and applied here to analyse evidence on the impact of P4P, 
including on utilisation of care, quality of care, organisation of services, provider motivation and 
behaviour, equity and patient payments, unintended consequences, health outcomes, costs and cost 
effectiveness, and sustainability. The most common domain which is reported is utilisation, but even 
here only seven of the 25 studies had findings which could be linked to the P4P intervention and the 
findings were mixed. There were some positive impacts for some indicators relating to facility 
deliveries and family planning, but no consistent pattern across schemes, in terms of which 
indicators responded positively, or the magnitude of response. This is likely to be linked to the 
different designs of schemes, the different payment amounts and systems, and the different starting 
points and degree of effort involved in changing indicators. 
 
For almost all impact areas there is a striking lack of evidence (especially for effects on equity, 
provider behaviour, organisation of care, and health outcomes). Cost effectiveness has not been 
assessed for any of the programmes. Deeper and broader studies are required to understand P4P 
and its impact on targeted indicators as well as wider systemic effects. 
 
Lessons on design and implementation 
The experiences documented are reviewed to derive lessons relating to design of P4P programmes, 
including on how performance is defined; the level of targeting of payments; how payments are 
calculated and how large they should be; how many targets should be used; types of services which 
are suitable; verification requirements; complementary measures; and purchasing arrangements. 
Many of these issues are necessarily very contextual. 
 
Some of the more developed schemes are based in post-conflict areas, and there is some evidence 
that these can present suitable conditions for P4P, paradoxically (commentators emphasise the 
necessary organisational preconditions, which are ambitious – nevertheless, there may be more 
need and scope for reform in post-conflict areas).  
 
Despite the rhetoric relating to outcomes, most schemes fund outputs and some specify quite 
detailed levels of process. This raises the questions of the degree to which P4P increases provider 
autonomy, which is one of the channels through which it might bring about gains. 
 
Conclusions and outstanding questions 
It is clear that P4P can have a positive influence on health outputs, at least in some contexts, and in 
the short term. However, there are a number of important areas which remain to be better 
understood. These include: 
 
• the long-term impact of P4P, assuming it is intended as a long-term financing mechanism as 
opposed to a short-term behaviour modifier 
• its health systems impact, particularly in terms of: 
o  integration/fragmentation of financing channels 
o  effectiveness of purchasing arrangements 
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o information systems 
o pay policy 
o non-targeted services (and how adverse effects can be controlled) 
o capacity building 
o governance arrangements 
• its impact on health outcomes, which study designs have not yet been able to reveal 
• its equity effects and impact on patient payments 
• analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the approach, particularly related to alternative methods of 
achieving similar goals (wider performance management tools; increasing provider autonomy; 
direct facility funding; pay reforms) 
• its sustainability, given the high degree of donor dependence to date (financial and technical)  
• its strengths and weaknesses as a mechanism for international aid, especially in terms of 
consistency with the Paris Declaration and its impact on aid harmonisation and transactions 
costs 
• how to increase its efficiency – particularly reducing the high overhead costs recorded in most 
schemes to date 
• its effects on health workers’ motivation and behaviour (in the LMIC setting), and how to 
maintain motivation over longer periods of time 
• a better understanding of the contextual factors favouring the use of P4P, including in relation to 
the process of its introduction, and to the necessary systems capacity prior to introduction 
• learning on design issues, such as how to design payment systems to minimise inflationary 
tendencies and promote quality of care, as well as on the magnitude of payments required to 
improve performance in different settings 
The paper concludes that overall evidence base remains weak. P4P may be beneficial in some 
settings, but should not be introduced without a careful diagnosis of the blockages in the health 
system, and consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of all strategies to address them. 
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Objectives of paper 
Improving the performance of health care delivery systems is an important objective, both in high-
income settings and, even more critically, in low- and middle-income (LMIC) settings, where 
resources for health are much more constrained. Pay for performance (P4P) is currently receiving 
increased attention as a strategy for improving the performance of healthcare providers, 
organisations and governments. It is also promoted as an important tool for achieving the health 
Millennium Development Goals, improving the effectiveness of development aid, and motivating 
patients to improve their attendance at health facilities and compliance with recommended health 
interventions. While P4P is used across a variety of services, targets relating to sexual and 
reproductive health (SRH) are at the heart of many of the recent schemes. However, there is 
currently a lack of rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in improving health care 
and health, particularly in lower income countries (Oxman and Fretheim 2008; Eldridge and Palmer 
2009; Witter et al. 2012).  
 
The objective of this paper is to summarise the evidence to date on the impact of RBF mechanisms 
on the delivery of sexual and reproductive health (SHR) services in low and middle-income countries.  
Research methods 
 
Search strategy 
 
A literature search was conducted in October-November 2011 of multiple databases - Jstor, The 
Cochrane Library, Pubmed, IngentaConnect; Springer Link; Science Direct. In addition, we searched 
Google scholar and Google as well as the World Bank’s internal library and the Results Based 
Financing Website (www.rbfhealth.org). We also reviewed reference lists.  
 
The following key words were used: pay for performance; performance-based funding/finance; 
output-based funding/aid; results-based funding/finance; target payment; performance-based 
contracting; supply side financing/funding.  
 
They were combined with SHR terms: reproductive health OR sexual health OR maternal health OR 
deliveries OR obstetric care OR family planning OR neonatal care OR antenatal care OR postnatal 
care OR sexually transmitted infections OR HIV OR abortion care OR fertility. 
 
After review the paper was updated in 2013, although a full search of all databases was not re-run at 
this point. 
 
Study selection 
 
A number of recent papers on P4P have been discursive/viewpoints. These are still relevant for the 
discussion, but we have focussed on extracting findings from papers containing primary data on the 
impact of a RBF scheme covering SRH services in a low or middle-income setting. 
 
Within SHR, the following are the main focal areas (following the WHO definition of SHR1): 
• improving antenatal, perinatal, postpartum and newborn care;  
• providing high-quality services for family planning, including infertility services; 
• eliminating unsafe abortion; 
                                                           
1
 http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/about_us/en/index.html 
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• combating sexually transmitted infections, including HIV, reproductive tract infections, 
cervical cancer and other sexual and reproductive health morbidities; 
• promoting sexual health 
Exclusions from the review 
 
While it is conceivable that pay increases designed to increase motivation and retention of staff 
might fall within this definition, in this review we focus on reforms which are explicitly linked to 
changing patterns of activity, output or outcome indicators (thus excluding routine changes to pay or 
public funding flows or user fee regimes). 
 
Another summary paper has recently addressed the use of demand-side financing for SHR services in 
LMICs (Witter 2013). This review therefore focuses on evidence of the impacts of supply-side 
measures focussed on service providers.  
 
Studies relating purely to high income countries were also excluded (using the World Bank 
classification of countries). 
Background 
Definitions and modalities 
Pay for performance is commonly understood to refer to the transfer of money or material goods 
conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target (Eichler 
2006). The plethora of terms commonly used in this field – results-based financing, performance-
based incentives, pay for performance, performance-based contracting, conditional cash transfers, 
cash on delivery, and others – can cause confusion. Some have taken on a specific meaning 
(Musgrove 2011), although there is not always full consensus. Conditional cash transfers are 
commonly used to denote payments or near-cash transfers such as vouchers to beneficiaries. Some 
terms are specific to aid, such as cash on delivery or output-based aid. Performance-based 
contracting is used when contracts are drawn up with non-state actors, such as non-governmental 
organizations. Performance based funding is often used to specify a particular model in which 
providers are paid retrospectively according to verified outputs, modified by quality measures. Other 
labels are more general, including results-based financing, and pay for performance. We use the 
term P4P here to capture all types of supply-side conditional financing. 
 
While paying for performance is a relatively simple and ancient concept, it includes a wide range of 
interventions that vary with respect to the level at which the incentives are targeted (recipients of 
healthcare, individual providers of healthcare, health care facilities, private sector organizations, 
public sector organizations and national or sub-national levels). Paying for performance 
interventions can also be used to reward a wide range of measurable actions, including health 
outcomes, delivery of effective interventions (for instance immunization), utilization of services 
(such as prenatal visits or births at an accredited facility), and quality of care (Witter et al. 2012). 
Paying for performance interventions typically also include ancillary components, such as increasing 
the availability of resources for health care, education, supplies, technical support or training, 
monitoring and feedback, increasing salaries, construction of new facilities, improvements in 
planning and management or information systems etc (Oxman and Fretheim 2008).  
 
Paying for performance typically takes three main forms: 
• Conditional cash payment (payment per output or outcome) 
• Conditional provision of material goods 
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• Target payments (payments for reaching a certain level of coverage, which can be defined in 
absolute terms or relative to a starting point) 
The arrangements in relation to payments and expected outputs (in quantity or quality terms) are 
often expressed in a contract between purchaser and provider. 
 
It seems likely that schemes targeted at different levels will vary in their characteristics. It may 
therefore be useful to analyse schemes according to the following categories: 
1. Those targeted at national level (e.g. aid programmes, global health initiatives etc.) 
2. Those targeted at intermediate levels – regions or districts, for example, or non-
governmental organisations 
3. Those targeted at facility level 
4. Those targeted at individual health worker level 
Other factors, such as the magnitude of the payments, the nature of the targeted indicators, starting 
levels of coverage for those services, and the systems for assessing them would also be expected to 
play an important role determining the outcome of P4P schemes. 
 
Rationale for P4P 
On one level, paying for performance, in terms of outputs, is not new – it has taken the form of user 
fees, which in many low and middle income countries it remains one of the main forms of health 
financing. It is also commonly used in insurance and contracting payment systems. However, public 
funding for health (including aid funding, where this is channelled through governments) has 
traditionally not been linked to specific activities, but has taken the form of budget flows, which are 
linked to indicators such as staffing levels or bed numbers (for facilities), inputs (such as estimated 
drug needs), population numbers (for regions and districts, in some cases) and also historical trends 
in expenditure (all modified by overall budget constraints) (Witter et al. 2012). 
 
These bureaucratic mechanisms offer the advantage of stability, and predictability, and rely on local 
clinical judgement as to how and what services to offer. The disadvantage, however, is that health 
systems based on budget funding and salaried staff can lack incentives to improve quality, to 
increase outputs and to improve outcomes. Paying for performance aims to reintroduce those 
incentives by linking pay (at individual or facility level) to desired activities and/or outcome 
indicators. It may in addition increase resources (by providing supplementary funding) or may be an 
alternative mechanism for channelling existing funding resources (substituting for existing funds). 
 
In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, paying for 
performance is generally described as a tool for improving quality (Christianson, Leatherman, & 
Sutherland 2007; Petersen et al. 2006). In LMICs, however, it generally has wider objectives. These 
include (Witter et al. 2012): 
• to increase the allocative efficiency of health services (by encouraging the provision of high 
priority and cost effective services) 
• to increase their technical efficiency (by making better use of existing resources such as health 
staff) 
• to improve equity of outcomes (for example, by encouraging expansion of services to hard-to-
reach groups) 
Others emphasise the potential of some forms, such as PBF, to transform health sectors, introducing 
client-oriented public finance models inspired by the new public management mode (Meessen et al. 
2011). PBF aims at improving provider performance through allowing providers greater control over 
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resources and encouraging system efficiencies. It aims to shift the performance risk to the provider 
of service, making them directly responsible for the agreed outputs. When designed properly, it is 
argued, PBF can be an efficient tool for improving organization, production, management, and 
quality of services through influencing the behaviour of healthcare providers (Eichler 2006, Brenzel 
2009, Meessen et al. 2011).  There is also a widespread perception that existing methods of funding 
providers are unreliable in getting resources to the front-line and that P4P may offer a more 
effective channel. 
 
Assumptions and risks 
Paying providers for performance is clearly premised on the assumption that for these three 
dimensions to shift, a change in behaviour on the provider side is required. If, however, the barriers 
to service uptake and use are more connected with demand side factors (such as low affordability of 
services), then paying for performance for providers alone will not be effective. However, by 
incentivising providers to increase outputs, it is hoped that they will in turn take measures to boost 
demand, for example by reducing fees or making services more attractive. 
 
One theoretical advantage of performance pay is that explicit financial incentives are provided even 
when patient demand for health care is unresponsive to (unable to accurately assess) technical 
quality of care. This theoretical advantage relies on a host of assumptions, including the ability to 
assess quality accurately, the linkage of P4P performance systems with appropriate quality 
measures, robust information systems and the absence of adverse consequences (Witter et al. 
2012). 
 
Clearly, incentives would be expected to operate differently at these different levels: incentives to 
individuals are likely to be more directly motivating (incentives to organisations only affect 
behaviour indirectly, if passed on in some way to individuals), but may undermine cooperation 
(unlike organisational incentives, which might be expected to reinforce cooperation). 
 
P4P relies on the power of extrinsic motivation. However, there is a substantial literature which 
emphasises other factors which motivate health professionals, including professional and social 
status and altruism (see, for example, Deci et al. 1999). Moreover there may be other barriers to 
changing professional behaviour, even when professionals are motivated, including patient factors, 
lack of time, lack of technical skills, lack of resources, and organisational constraints (Witter et al. 
2012). 
 
There is also the risk that financial incentives may dilute professionals’ intrinsic motivation and this is 
the subject of widespread debate around public sector motivation in higher income countries 
(Marquand 2004, Myers 2008). On the other hand, where health workers’ pay is low in absolute 
terms, incentives may be an important channel to improve motivation through increasing their 
income levels. The balance of effects is likely to depend on design and implementation, which could 
reinforce or undermine motivation. 
 
The timescale of evaluation is another important consideration. Financial incentives might be 
effective in the short run for simple and distinct, well-defined behavioural goals, but these are not 
necessarily sustained in the longer run.  
 
The potential failure to sustain P4P schemes also offers the significant risk of demotivating the 
workforce. Loss aversion suggests that the demotivating effects of reduced or discontinued 
payments might be greater than the original motivation of increases. 
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Other risks which have been identified (Oxman & Fretheim 2008; Witter et al. 2012) include: 
• distortion – ignoring important services which are not rewarded with incentives, including 
untargeted services and more complex dimensions of performance 
• cherry-picking – focussing on services which provide greatest gain with least effort over others 
which may be as or more important; this may also increase inequity in some cases (where 
poorer populations are harder to reach, for example) 
• gaming - improving or cheating on reporting rather than improving performance 
• financial dependency 
• inefficiency – high operating costs and low returns may make this a poor investment 
• fiduciary risks – if funds are poorly controlled, then leakage and corruption may be increased 
• coercion – if clients are pressured to accept a service or undergo a procedure to increase 
provider rewards (e.g. for family planning uptake) 
Scale and scope of PBF for sexual & reproductive health 
 
There is now nearly 20 years of accumulated experience of P4P in the health sector of LMICs. A 
recent report states that over 20 countries have introduced PBF (Meessen et al. 2011), but this is 
almost certainly out of date, as a number of new schemes have begun since then. Many of these 
countries, such as India, Afghanistan and Rwanda, have employed PBF specifically with the aim of 
improving maternal and child health outcomes, the two most lagging areas within the MDGs 
globally.  
 
The schemes commonly cover a range of services, including primary care provision, family planning 
services, and maternal and neonatal care. In terms of levels of payment, they are most commonly 
provided to facilities or individual providers. A brief description is given here of some of the better 
documented programmes which support SRH services, gathered according to the main level at 
which payments are made (see also the summary in Table 1). Many programmes provide a mix (e.g. 
payments to district teams and to facilities).  There are many more as yet undocumented schemes. 
 
Payments to governments 
 
Global health initiatives, such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) and the 
Global Fund to fight against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), use P4P mechanisms linked to 
contracts between the donor agency and national governments. They are best known for their 
contribution to immunisation and control of infectious diseases. However, more recent health 
system strengthening (HSS) grants may be linked to SHR services. For example, in Cambodia, GAVI 
HSS grants were given to 10 districts for improving maternal, reproductive and child health.  Part of 
the grant was paid to health centres as a fee-for-service incentive to the team, paid for a limited sub-
set of activities, including $0.50 per consultation with children under 5, $1 per ANC, PNC, Tetanus 
Typhoid, DPT-HB and measles immunization, iron/folate supplementation and birth-spacing visit 
(Hawkins 2011). There is no evaluation as yet of the impact of these grants, which also include 
unconditional elements related to, for example, remoteness. 
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Payments to mid-level structures 
 
Payments to local governments 
 
P4P arrangements between central and local (for example, provincial) governments are more 
common in Latin America. Argentina’s Plan Nacer scheme focuses on uninsured pregnant women 
and children under the age of 6 through an incentive mechanism between the National Ministry of 
Health and the Provincial Government, and between the Provincial Government and health-care 
providers. The World Bank provided a loan that pays $5 per person per month in eligible provinces. 
Provinces receive a capitation fee of $10 per person per month. A first payment of 60% is made on 
the basis of the number of people enrolled, with the remaining 40% paid out in relation to meeting 
such targets as the number of women with a first antenatal visit before week 20, share of children 
who are vaccinated for measles, and the number of children born with healthy weight. The 
provinces write contracts with individual health providers, for the purchase of 72 services in all. 
Provinces determine their own fee schedules and administrative arrangements. 
 
Brazil’s Family Health Project, supported by the World Bank, also provides P4P-based transfers to 
local government. This makes per capita transfers to local municipalities on the basis of planned 
increases in certain services, such as safe delivery of babies for low-income women, monitoring of 
infants’ nutritional status and growth, and treatment of poor children for various illnesses. If the 
municipalities reach these targets and several others, they will continue to be eligible for future 
financial transfers; otherwise, the level of central government support will be reduced (Hecht et al. 
2004). 
 
Payments to NGOs & contractors 
 
Performance-based contracting through NGOs for service delivery is often favoured in post-conflict 
setting. One of the earliest examples was in Haiti, where, since 1999, USAID has funded local NGOs 
with a P4P-component to its payment mechanism. Since 2005, NGOs received 94 percent of the 
estimated budget needed to deliver a defined package of services to a catchment population in 
quarterly payments. In addition, NGOs could earn the 6 percent “withheld” plus another 6 percent if 
they achieved predetermined performance targets. Indicators focussed on child health (e.g. fully 
immunized children under one) and maternal health (proportion of pregnant women receiving at 
least four prenatal care visits and proportion of women with institutional deliveries). NGO-reported 
results are validated through random administrative audits at the facility level and random 
household visits to verify that services were received. 
 
In Afghanistan, NGOs were contracted to deliver a basic package of services, funded by a variety of 
donors (mainly the World Bank, USAID and the EC). The modalities differed between donors. For the 
USAID project, MSH specified targets to implementing NGOs, with the sanction of non-payment if 
targets were not met. For the World Bank, bonuses of 10% were offered if targets were met 
(Sondorp et al. 2009). 
 
Cambodia was another early example of contracting of services to NGOs, with a performance-based 
element. Two models - contracting in and contracting out of services – were tested. Targets for 
service coverage were set for the NGOs. At health worker level, staff in contracted in districts 
received pay which was partly performance related, while staff in contracted out districts received 
fixed higher pay (Bloom et al. 2007). 
 
The World Bank project in DRC, now covering 89 health zones with total population coverage of 10 
million, has adopted a performance-based contract on two levels (NGO and health worker). A total 
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of 10% of the project budget is earmarked for incentives, equivalent to $0.40 per capita in the recent 
phase, 2007-10 (Johannes et al. 2008). 
 
Many P4P schemes are in the early stages of implementation. In South Sudan, for example, a portion 
of the funding from donors to lead agencies who are implementing the Umbrella Programme for 
Health Sector Development since 2009 is based on hitting approximate targets for 13 indicators. 
These include inputs, processes and outputs (such as increased coverage of FP, ANC and health 
facility deliveries) (Morgan 2011).  In Liberia, USAID began supporting contracts with NGOs that pay 
partly based on results in 2009.  
 
An example from a more stable context is the Innovations in Family Planning project, funded by 
USAID since 1994 in Uttar Pradesh state, India (Rowan 2009). This channels funding to a local NGO to 
develop plans to increase FP access, use, and quality. A P4P mechanism is used to fund the NGO, 
SIFPSA, which in turn provides cost-based reimbursements of activities by implementers (NGOs and 
public departments). The performance indicators are largely process-related, with funds being paid 
out once activities are completed.  
 
Output-based aid projects, like the Kenya and Uganda voucher programmes for reproductive health 
care, may also channel international funds direct to non-governmental organisations. Although 
these programmes offer demand-side finance (DSF), the funding modality fits with P4P in that 
payments from the donors are made according to the number of services delivered by the 
organisation managing the voucher schemes (see Witter 2013 for further discussion of DSF 
experiences).  
 
Payments to facilities 
 
In Rwanda, a number of donor-supported PBF pilot projects in different provinces were used to 
inform a national scheme. In 2005, the government decided to introduce incentives as a supplement 
to input-based budgets at primary health care centres. Bonuses were established for 14 maternal 
and child healthcare output indicators (e.g. children who completed vaccinations on time, women 
who received appropriate tetanus vaccines during prenatal care) and 10 clinical services and care 
indicators related to HIV. The bonuses were adjusted in proportion to each facility’s progress on 
structural and process indicators of health care quality. Facilities reported their monthly indicators 
to steering committees that were responsible for authorizing payment. The reports were verified by 
auditors who would control the monthly invoices at the health centre level. In addition, on a 
quarterly basis, a different team would visit each health facility to evaluate their health care quality 
indicators. Payments went directly to facilities, which had full discretion in their use. Of 80 facilities 
surveyed in 2006-2008, the payments represented an average 22 percent increase in funds above 
the regular input-based budget, 77 percent of which was used to increase take-home pay for staff 
(Basinga et al. 2010). 
 
The central Africa region hosts a number of PBF schemes which use a similar design – not only 
Rwanda, which is the best documented and known, but also Burundi and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). In these cases, these policies began with pilot schemes managed by international 
NGOs, which were later scaled up, at least in Rwanda and Burundi, with continued technical and 
financial support. In Burundi, health facilities receive payments for delivering a list of priority 
services (maternal and child health, family planning, TB, and HIV). Scores on quality assessments 
provide potential increases of up to 15 percent of total fees received (Busogoro & Beith 2010). 
 
In other countries, smaller scale NGO projects have been piloted (e.g. CORDAID-supported 
programmes in Zambia and Tanzania, working with Catholic dioceses and facilities) (Toonen et al. 
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2009). A pilot programme with a quasi-experimental design was implemented in Uganda in 2003-6 
but not rolled out. 118 health facilities – largely mission private not-for-profit (PNFP) facilities – were 
randomised to a control group, a group without P4P but with increased autonomy in its use of 
existing resources, and a P4P-group, which was able to gain an additional 11% of its block grant for 
meeting three of the six performance targets. The targets were increased numbers of ANC visits, 
supervised deliveries, uptake of family planning, children immunised, malaria treatment for children 
and outpatient visits (Morgan 2010).   
 
Many performance-based incentive programmes have just recently started – for example, in 2011 
primary level facilities and staff in Sierra Leone started to receive performance-related incentives. As 
in Burundi, these supply-side measures were designed to complement a policy of providing free care 
for mothers and under-five year olds. Primary Health Units were to receive P4P funds every quarter 
based on delivery of six key reproductive and child health interventions, including ANC, FP, 
supervised deliveries and PNC (Amara 2011). Fixed amounts were to be paid per targeted output. 
The P4P funds were to be divided between incentives for staff and investment or operational costs 
for the facility. District health teams and Local Councils would supervise and verify service delivery 
and use of the P4P funds. 
 
 
Payments to health workers 
 
In a number of countries, P4P payments targeted at health workers and community health workers 
have been wrapped up in programmes offering demand-side incentives to increase facility-based 
deliveries. The largest example is India, where the Janani Soraksha Yojana (JSY) aims at reducing 
maternal and child mortality through both demand and supply side incentives. The JSY is a national 
programme that is administered by each state independently. The programme is centrally funded 
from the federal budget and various donors. Supply side incentives in the form of cash payments are 
provided to female health workers, the Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA). The ASHAs act as 
bridge between the public health system and communities, and are responsible for registering 
pregnant women for facility-based births, arranging for in-facility deliveries, accompanying pregnant 
women to facilities and staying with them during their deliveries. These health workers are also 
responsible for follow-up visits and ensuring that newborns are duly immunized.  Payments are 
received on verification of service provision, with the main trigger being an in-facility delivery (Dagur 
et al. 2010; Lim et al. 2010; UNFPA 2009).   
 
A similar policy has been implemented in Nepal, with the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP), 
which combines fee exemption with cash transfer to women and a flat-rate payment to health staff 
carrying out deliveries (both in facilities and at home). This was introduced in 2005 and continues to 
be operated as part of the 2009 Aama programme (Witter et al. 2011b).  
 
Some health worker incentive schemes are operated at small scale as part of NGO-run projects. This 
was the case in Bhattagram, Pakistan, where Save the Children offered performance-based 
incentives to government health staff as part of its district health services reconstruction project 
(Witter et al. 2011a). In this case, performance was measured monthly at facility level (based on 27 
supervision targets and 8 performance targets), but paid directly into health worker bank accounts.  
 
In other cases, policies cover several provinces. An example is the Philippines, where women health 
teams, which include a midwife, “barangay” (village) health worker, and a traditional birth 
attendant, receive payment for every poor mother referred and for women who deliver in a health 
institution in several provinces (Gonzales  et al. 2009). These performance-related grants were 
introduced in 2008 as part of an integrated Maternal Neonatal and Child Health strategy. The grants 
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to local government units covered provision of family planning for poor women, in the first case, and 
then support for facility deliveries (including cash payments to women, to traditional birth 
attendants for referring women in to facilities for their delivery, to the health staff and health 
teams). $22 is paid to the team per facility delivery. In some provinces this includes the $11 transfer 
to the mother, while in others this is paid separately. The programme is funded by the World Bank in 
two provinces.  
 
In other cases, health worker incentive schemes are operated nationwide. In Cambodia, for example, the 
government has, since 2007, paid midwives a $15 allowance per live birth in a health centre or 
health post, or a $10 allowance per delivery in a regional or national hospital.  Funds are allocated 
for this incentive in the MoH budget. A study of MCH incentives in one province found that many 
health centres were paying a share of the midwifery incentive to the Village Health Support Group 
($2.40) or Traditional Birth Attendant ($1.20) when they referred pregnant women to the HC for 
delivery. (An MoH circular encourages this.)  Some HCs instead used part of the incentive to pay for a 
gift given to the mothers to reward them for coming to the HC for delivery.  The study also reports 
that in this province at least, the incentive (along with other forms of performance based payment) 
was usually shared equally among staff, although the incentive is paid to individual midwives 
(Murakami 2009, cited in Hawkins 2011). 
 
In Tanzania, the Government of Norway agreed to contribute US$32 million over five years to reduce 
maternal and child mortality, with pay for performance as one of the strategies to be used. This led 
to the introduction of a pay for performance scheme in 2008. The scheme consisted of bonuses to 
public and mission health facilities that attained performance targets related to maternal and 
newborn health and timely and accurate data collection (Morgan & Eichler 2009). The scheme was 
rolled out nationwide without piloting. However, donors declined to fund bonuses, due to 
differences of views on the process and design. The bonus payments were made to facilities, and 
district and regional health teams, to be shared equally amongst employees. As rules on awarding 
bonuses were not clear, donors felt that it would be used as a universal salary top-up (Morgan & 
Eichler 2009). 
How policies were introduced 
 
International donors have played an important role in promoting and funding P4P and demand-side 
pay for performance programmes (USAID 2010). The World Bank supports P4P programmes in a 
number of countries, including pilots in eight countries that will include impact evaluations funded 
by a trust fund. Norway has bilateral arrangements in a number of countries (India, Nigeria, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Pakistan), in addition to the funds provided through the World Bank Health Results Trust 
Fund. The Department for International Development (DFID) also contributes to the Trust Fund and 
is considering a broader results-based financing strategy. KFW (German Development Bank) is 
supporting output-based aid (vouchers) and is beginning to support broader P4P programs with both 
supply- and demand-side incentives. Belgian Technical Cooperation has supported P4P in Burundi, 
Rwanda, and the DRC. AusAID has supported development of P4P designs in a number of Asian 
countries. Currently, the GAVI Alliance (GAVI), the Global Fund, and the World Bank are working on 
operationalizing a joint platform for health systems strengthening that intends to incorporate P4P. 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank have supported conditional cash 
transfers in a number of countries, primarily in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. 
 
The role of international NGOs has been significant in piloting and managing schemes in many 
countries, at least in the initial phase. In Haiti, performance-based contracting was introduced by 
USAID in the late 1990s. The programme was initially administered in country with support from 
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Management Sciences for Health (MSH), a US-based international NGO. MSH administered the 
programme through 3 NGOs on a limited scale at first, and later expanded to 25 NGOs, covering 2.7 
million people, with USAID support.  
 
In Africa, P4P schemes in Tanzania, Zambia, Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda have been pioneered by 
international NGOs such as Cordaid and Healthnet TPO (Vergeer & Collins 2008; Canavan & Swai 
2008; Vinard 2011). In some cases these were later scaled up, with government and donor support 
(e.g. in Burundi and Rwanda).  
 
The process of developing the P4P schemes is not detailed for many of these schemes, but it is likely 
that a wider degree of participation in the process of development is one of the factors explaining 
the more successful schemes. For example, the Zambia and Tanzania pilots were agreed at diocesan 
level, with minimal involvement of government representatives or indeed facility managers, which is 
thought to be one of the factors behind their disappointing results (Toonen et al. 2009). Similarly, in 
Tanzania, the level of donor-government consensus on the design was limited (Morgan 2010). In a 
number of cases, particularly in relation to performance-based contracting, the main funders and 
contract managers have been external, with government playing a minimal role.  
 
A clear problem analysis is recommended before introducing P4P (Eichler and De 2008) but it is not 
clear whether all schemes started from a clear understanding of the main blockages and of why P4P 
might be the best solution to them. A more recent manual emphasises that P4P is not a model but 
an approach, and one which should start from a bottom-up action-research approach involving all 
key actors (Toonen and van der Wal, 2012). 
Evidence to date of impact 
Framework for assessment 
Based on the objectives laid out above for P4P programmes, a conceptual framework for assessing 
them has been developed (Figure 1). It follows the logic of inputs, intermediate goals and ultimate 
goals and defines some of the areas of enquiry in assessing the effectiveness and impact of a P4P 
programme. The paper looks for evidence on these different nodes, starting with impact and then 
moving to observations on preconditions for success (which link to the input elements in the figure). 
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework for assessing impact of P4P programmes 
 
Quality of current evidence 
Before examining the current findings on impact of P4P schemes, it is important to assess the overall 
strength of the evidence base.  As seen above, P4P schemes are wide-ranging in approach, and many 
are recent. Much of their documentation is internal. Of the 100 or so documents reviewed for this 
paper, only a few were peer-reviewed articles. Many are descriptive briefs or reports by project 
funders and implementers.  
 
A recent systematic review of P4P in low and middle-income settings concluded that ‘overall, the 
quality of evidence is graded as low or very low, with limited numbers of studies reporting on 
specific indicators, high risk of bias in most studies, and inconsistency of findings. We conclude that 
there are few robust studies of PBF available from a low- or middle-income context and it is 
premature to draw any firm conclusions on its effectiveness or factors that determine its 
effectiveness’ (Witter et al. 2012). Only one study was assessed as having low risk of bias (Peabody 
et al. 2011), which is not included in this review as it focussed on curative child health services. 
 
Problems which were common amongst the studies identified (Witter et al. 2012) included: 
• Non-random allocation of the intervention 
• Additional resources and ancillary components that may be responsible for impacts rather than 
conditional payments 
• Other confounders (e.g. contextual differences between intervention and non-intervention 
groups) 
• Lack of rigorous before and after measures of effect 
• Lack of consideration of wider systemic issues (e.g. adverse impacts on other services) 
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• A plethora of targets (outcome measures) and consequently a high risk of selective outcome 
reporting (i.e. reporting statistically significant results and not reporting results that are not 
statistically significant) 
• Conflicting interests (due to P4P being evaluated by individuals and organisations that are 
advocating and implementing it) 
• Evidence of publication bias (with negative findings being less likely to be published that positive 
ones)  
• Not measuring health outcomes, which means that the relationship between process measures 
and health benefits is uncertain 
These concerns are shared by other reviewers (Eldridge & Palmer 2009; Oxman & Fretheim 2008) 
and by the World Bank, which acknowledges that there is a lack of strong evidence base, despite 
nearly 20 years of involvement in P4P programmes (Brenzel et al. 2008).  This has led to new focus 
on generating robust evidence, supported by a toolkit for conducting impact evaluations 
(Vermeersch et al. 2012). There are currently 16 impact evaluations underway, funded by the Health 
Results Innovation Trust Fund, with others in preparation, testing a variety of designs2. 
 
In addition to concerns about the internal validity of studies, there are concerns about the narrow 
frame for evaluating P4P programmes to date. There have been calls in recent years for a broader 
health system framework for monitoring and evaluating PBF, rather than focussing on targeted 
output indicators, as is commonly the case in current studies (Witter et al. 2013), for a greater focus 
on understanding PBF processes and mechanisms (Witter et al. 2013, Ssengooba et al. 2011, Macq & 
Chiem 2011). Others also point to the need for broader assessment of P4P programmes against the 
DAC criteria (Perrin 2013).  
 
Utilisation of services/coverage of programmes 
Most  schemes identified (see Table 1) target a common set of services, including antenatal care, 
immunisation, family planning, assisted deliveries, postnatal care and, in some cases, child nutrition 
and monitoring. Some also fund general outpatient care (e.g. DRC and Burundi) and indicators linked 
to inpatient care (e.g. inpatient turnover in Zambia). As the aim of the P4P programme is to increase 
coverage and utilisation of these services, it is not surprising that this is the output/outcome 
indicator most commonly reported in studies (see Table 2). 
 
Nevertheless, of the 25 schemes and studies identified, only seven included information on 
utilisation which could be linked in any way to the P4P intervention (some because of demand-side 
interventions, others because of lack of controls of any description).  
 
The most robust is the Rwanda study, which provided equivalent additional resources to control 
facilities. It found (Basinga et al. 2010): 
• No impact of PBF on the probability of any prenatal care or on the probability of completing four 
or more visits 
• A statistically significant impact on the probability of institutional delivery (7% absolute increase, 
rising from 35% before to 42% after) 
• For children, a significant increase in the likelihood of a preventive visit in the four weeks prior to 
the survey, but no impact on the likelihood of full vaccination 
                                                           
2
 See http://www.rbfhealth.org/project/our-projects for latest details. 
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• Related analysis of payments for HIV testing found an increase of 6.1% in the probability of 
individuals having ever been tested 
Results from other studies have to be interpreted with particular caution, given the risk of bias issues 
highlighted above. Broadly, the Tanzania and Zambia studies found that performance of the 
intervention (mission) facilities was similar to or worse than the ’control’ government ones for the 
indicators tracked (outpatients visits, antenatal care, voluntary counselling and testing, in-patients 
and institutional deliveries). 
 
Outputs for which relative risks could be calculated, based on the original data, were assessed in the 
systematic review (Witter et al. 2012). In Burundi, a statistically significant difference was found for 
institutional deliveries, favouring the intervention sites (RR: 1.79), but in the DRC, the reverse was 
found (statistically significant difference, but RR of 0.75). Coverage of bed nets was statistically 
significantly higher in Burundi (RR: 1.9). In Tanzania, inpatient admissions were significantly lower in 
intervention sites (RR: 0.82).  In Burundi, pregnant women were statistically significantly more likely 
to be fully vaccinated (RR: 1.13). For all other indicators, no statistically significant difference was 
found. 
 
The performance-based contracting programme in Haiti showed success in some areas, with 
immunization coverage increasing between 13 and 24 percentage points, and increased births by 
skilled attendants from 17 to 27 percentage points (Eichler et al. 2007). However, prenatal and 
postnatal care did not respond significantly, which is attributed to a ‘strong patient behavioural 
element’. Later analysis of this scheme found that a 39% increase in primary health care services 
could be attributed to the incentives element, and that there were no unintended effects on 
unrewarded services (Zeng et al. 2012). It should be noted however that the scheme had an unusual 
design, in which incentives (averaging 6% of funding to the NGOs) was awarded annually for services 
which were identified after the year-end (to avoid gaming and neglect of untargeted services). 
 
The Uganda pilot found that the PBF intervention group (despite winning bonuses in relation to 
targets) performed less well than the group which simply received more autonomy, and about as 
well as the control group (Morgan 2010). 
 
Overall, then, the findings on utilisation of care are mixed. There is no pattern across schemes, in 
terms of which indicators responded positively, or the magnitude of response. This is likely to be 
linked to the different designs of schemes, the different payment amounts and systems, and the 
different starting points and degree of effort involved in changing indicators. 
Quality of care 
Very few studies provided details on independently assessed quality of care, although six out of 25 
provided some measure of quality of care, including process indicators and patient and staff 
perceptions. Again, overall findings are mixed. 
 
In Rwanda, quality of prenatal care was assessed by comparing activities undertaken during prenatal 
visits with the local clinical practice guideline and by investigating whether a tetanus typhoid 
vaccination was given during prenatal check-ups. Significant improvements in both measures are 
reported for the intervention group (Basinga et al. 2010). In addition to these measures, the 
payment of incentives was linked to a composite quality measure, based on quarterly direct 
observation by district supervisors and medical records review. The scores for this broader quality 
assessment are not reported. However, a later analysis found that incentives reduced the gap 
between provider knowledge and practice of appropriate clinical procedures by 20 percent, and that 
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there was a strong complementarity between performance incentives and provider skill (Gertler and 
Vermeersch, 2012). 
 
Other studies provide anecdotal information of unintended negative consequences for quality of 
care. In one study (with a very limited sample), staff reported neglecting essential but untargeted 
duties, such as potentially life-preserving activities in the intensive care unit of hospitals, and 
counter-productive behaviour such as not distributing the last drug box of the pharmacy to avoid a 
stock-out (Kalk et al. 2010). There is also anecdotal evidence of similar distortions and possible 
perverse effects from a number of other studies (Macro International 2009; Eichler 2006). 
 
In Cambodia, improvements in process indicators such as staff availability are reported in contracted 
areas, but also negative perceptions by patients (Bloom et al. 2007). 
 
In Uganda, exit polls showed that the perceived availability of medicines, attitude of staff, and the 
prices charged by the facility worsened in the view of the respondents in intervention areas (Morgan 
2010). 
 
Patient-assessed quality was found to be higher in PBF districts for most indicators (before and after 
the intervention) in the DRC project (Soeters and Kiwanuka 2008). Significant improvement was 
found in patient assessments of quality. However, managers were found to be dissatisfied in most 
facilities, particularly with the level of external support. 
 
In Burundi, there was an improvement in the PBF provinces for quality of care, as assessed by health 
professionals in hospitals and health centres. Quality of care as perceived by households declined for 
both groups (PBF and controls), with no significant difference between the two (Soeters and 
Kiwanuka 2009). 
 
Organisation of care  
One of the claims for P4P is that it can allow services to be organized in a more efficient way. It is 
therefore interesting to examine the findings on this from the studies which were identified, but 
here the evidence is even more limited. Most studies do not report impact in terms of the range of 
services offered or how they are organized. This was also reported by the systematic review, which 
found that ‘none reported on changes to organisation or delivery of services, on impacts for 
management and information systems or on wider impacts for financing or resource allocation, 
which is surprising, given the nature of the intervention’ (Witter et al. 2012). 
 
In some cases, such as the Global Fund, additional resources have allowed for the expansion of 
services, though these cannot be attributed to the P4P mechanism as such. In other cases, capacity 
building of NGOs was undertaken as an ancillary measure alongside the performance-based 
contracting (e.g. in Burundi). In Cambodia, better availability of services was reported in contracted-
in districts, but again the study does not support attribution of this to P4P. 
 
Although the impact of introducing P4P on organizational features may be hard to isolate, it appears 
from some studies that greater autonomy at facility level may in itself produce benefits (e.g. in 
Uganda, where facilities with autonomy out-performed the bonus and control groups). 
 
Provider motivation and behaviour 
Given that one of the main purposes of P4P is to motivate providers to deliver services in line with 
public priorities, it is surprisingly how little has been documented in terms of its impact on provider 
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motivation and behavior (including changes to working hours, absenteeism, dual practice, retention 
in rural areas, outmigration and informal charging of patients). 
 
In terms of staff satisfaction, it is to be expected that staff are pleased to receive what is, in almost 
all cases, additional funding, and indeed a number of reports do find this. However, responses are 
often nuanced, in that the funding comes with increased pressures and studies do not always 
differentiate responses to levels of pay with responses to the system for allocating it. In Rwanda 
some healthcare workers see it as another control mechanism (Kalk et al. 2010). They also 
complained about inadequate conditions to fulfil the targets, the time taken to comply with new 
paperwork, and potential damage to the provider-patient relationship. In Haiti, some of the 
feedback received pertained to the negative incentives embedded in the P4P programme. 
Participants complained about too much "stress" over meeting institutional targets, mainly from 
having to make organizational changes (Eichler et al. 2007). In the Nepal Safe Delivery Incentive 
Programme, the cash payment to staff was reported to have caused conflict and tension (Powell-
Jackson et al. 2008). In a district-based scheme in Pakistan, staff were not involved in setting targets, 
were not well informed of how their performance was assessed and were unhappy about the 
different systems operating for different types of staff (Witter et al. 2011a).  
 
These pressures can be constructive, or destructive (e.g. if targets are not met due to external 
constraints). Involvement in setting targets, ability to control the factors which affect those targets, 
perceived fair processes and transparency in measuring and rewarding them, and an adequate level 
of funding of targeted actions are all factors which are likely to improve staff responses. 
 
As P4P funding is not in most cases linked to individual performance, and is often paid in contexts 
where salaries are very low, it is in a number of cases perceived as a simple salary top-up scheme 
(Toonen et al. 2009; Hawkins 2011; Witter et al. 2011a).  
 
Equity, access and patient payments for care 
Reducing patient payments for care is not a primary objective of P4P programmes. However, some 
authors argue that these payments will allow providers to reduce their charges and will incentivize 
them to do so, especially in programmes which pay per unit of activity (e.g. a fixed payment per 
supervised delivery) (Soeters & Kiwanuka 2009). Conversely, there may be a risk with P4P of over-
consultation by the middle-classes and a failure to reach the poor. This was found in the pilot 
scheme in Uganda, where the wealth index of clients treated by the PNFP bonus group increased 
relative to that of the PNFPs in the control group (Morgan 2010). However, in general, little robust 
monitoring of equity effects has been undertaken.  
 
Only one study identified looked specifically at equity, by disaggregating changes to household 
payments in the PBF areas (Soeters and Kiwanuka 2008). Household payments as a proportion of 
income by the poorest were found to reduce more in intervention districts (by 63.5%, compared to a 
21.9% reduction in controls), though it should be noted that payments in PBF areas were at much 
higher level to start with. For the poor (second quartile), the reverse was found, with a 76.5% 
reduction in the controls, compared to a 36.2% reduction in intervention district households. 
 
In terms of overall patient payments, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, payments by patients 
were reported to increase in the intervention group (Soeters and Kiwanuka 2008), while in Burundi, 
they were reported to decrease (Soeters and Kiwanuka 2009). These differences are most likely 
explained by the differences in starting levels and also the heterogeneity not only of the intervention 
but also the support which was provided to the control areas (Witter et al. 2012).  In Cambodia, 
contracting out had a negative effect on out-of-pocket health spending (presumed due to switching 
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from informal and private providers), while contracting in had no statistically significant effect 
(Bloom et al. 2007). 
 
In some cases (e.g. Burundi and Rwanda), the PBF scheme has been introduced alongside reduction 
in financial barriers for users (though fee exemptions or reductions, and demand side payments), 
which complicates attribution of any distributional changes to PBF. 
 
In relation to geographic equity, there is a risk that areas with greater challenges are progressively 
marginalized, if it is harder for them to reach targets and so to receive funding. Some form of 
additional support may be needed. Again, there is very little research into the redistributive effects 
of P4P across facilities/areas. However, some schemes have adjusted payments to favour hard-to-
reach areas – for example, by increasing capitation payments for more remote provinces by 15% in 
DRC and up to 40% in Burundi. 
 
In relation to results-based aid at the national level, a review found that in some cases poorer 
countries find it hard to access funding in the first place. This is either because the application 
process is complex or because a prior performance record is required (Pearson 2010). 
They recommend that equity is emphasised at all stages of the identification and implementation of 
RBA/RBF schemes, including through the use of locally identified targets in low income countries 
(which might imply lower but still challenging targets as opposed to the use of global targets or 
standards), up front capacity building efforts and technical support, and different (simpler) approval 
processes. 
 
Unintended consequences  
Some authors make observations about side-effects (for example, the increased demand for 
technical advice at provincial level in Argentina following the Plan Nacer), but this does not provide 
the same quality of evidence as a study design which proactively seeks to monitor knock-on effects. 
Only three studies actively looked for unintended effects. In both Zambia and Tanzania there was a 
concern about the curative nature of the coverage targets and whether this may squeeze out 
preventive care. However, no conclusive evidence was found to support or refute this concern 
(Vergeer & Collins 2008; Canavan and Swai 2008). In Cambodia, some negative effects on untargeted 
services were identified for contracted out districts and positive effects in contracted in districts, but 
neither were statistically significant (Bloom et al. 2007). 
 
Although the risk of unintended consequences is highlighted for PBF in particular by many authors 
(Eichler & De 2008, for example), most study designs focus on measuring targeted indicators alone. 
The opportunity to investigate knock-on effects on other important but untargeted services and 
indeed on the health system as a whole has not yet been seized.  
 
The main area in which systemic effects have been studied to date is for results-based aid and the 
role of the global health initiatives. One recent study concluded that ‘many of the schemes reviewed 
run counter to at least some of the other principles of aid effectiveness (notably alignment with 
country systems and country ownership). This is partly a feature of the institutions which have taken 
RBA/RBF forward (e.g. GFATM, GAVI which have a disease specific, sub sectoral focus). Those that 
bypass government are not aligned, those that involve government may simply be an additional 
layer of donor interface which add little value. Many of the schemes are narrow which reduces the 
scope for strengthening the system as a whole and creates risks that they will further fragment the 
sectors they operate in’ (Pearson 2010). 
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Health outcomes 
The global health initiatives, such as the Global Fund, have estimates of health outcomes, but these 
cannot be attributed to the performance-based payment mechanism as such. A similar problem 
arises with the contracting pilot in Cambodia (Bloom et al. 2007). There is as yet no robust evidence 
of a link between P4P and health outcomes for SRH services, though there is a small body of 
evidence linking P4P with child health benefits (Peabody 2011, Gertler and Vermeersch 2012).  
Costs and cost effectiveness 
Magnitude of payments 
Overall expenditure on projects, where available, is reported in Table 3.  
 
Per capita costs are reported for a number of the projects, although these obvious cover varying 
packages of care: 
• $10 per capita per month for the Plan Nacer in Argentina 
• In Afghanistan, the contracts ranged from $3.8 (World Bank) to $5.22 per capita (EC) per year 
• $2.56 per capita per year in contracting in districts in Cambodia; $2.94 per capita in contracting 
out districts (61% and 85% higher respectively than comparison districts) 
• $2 per person per year, plus $0.4 for administration and overheads, in the DRC CORDAID pilot 
(and the same for Burundi, but with $0.6 added for management) 
• Euros 0.5 per capita per year in the Zambia and Tanzania CORDAID pilots 
• $0.25 per capita for health worker incentives alone in the World Bank DRC programme (funding 
service delivery through NGOs) 
How these global amounts were established is not clear. Nor is the system for establishing payments 
per item clear – reports generally provide no information, or state that they were based on 
discussions with stakeholders.  
 
Per item payments are reported in some cases, where providers are reimbursed per service. For 
example, in Rwanda, the tariff was $4.59 per delivery; $0.18 paid per child preventive visit; $1.83 for 
referral of malnourished child; $0.92 for TT and malaria prophylaxis during ANC; and $0.09 per ANC 
visit ($0.37 for all four visits). In Burundi, payments ranged from $0.25 per new OPD case to $10 for 
TB diagnosis. In the DRC, payments for health centres ranged from $0.30 per bed-day to $20 per TB 
patient successfully treated. Again, how these payments were established is not clear. 
 
Relative size of payments 
The relative magnitude of payments (relative to facility revenues and relative to staff salaries) might 
be expected to reveal something about the power of PBF as a lever. This is not reported in all cases. 
Where reported, the scale is quite varied: 
• In Tanzania, they amounted to 8% of facility income on average (Canavan & Swai 2008).  
• In Zambia, authors report that the PBF payments amounted to 17% of facility revenue and were 
small (but variable) relative to salaries (Vergeer & Collins 2008).  
• In the DRC pilot project, the proportion is not stated, but the incentives must have been the 
major component of funding for the health centres at least, as their overall revenues per person 
rose from $0.51 to $1.04 over the period (Soeters and Kiwanuka 2008).  
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• In Burundi, the intervention facilities surveyed received 58% of their total revenue from the PBF 
scheme in 2008 (Soeters and Kiwanuka, 2009). 
• In Rwanda, facility funding increased by 22% for PBF group as a whole. On average facilities 
allocated 77% of the PBF funds to increase personnel compensation, amounting to a 38% 
increase in staff salaries (Basinga et al. 2010)  
Is there evidence on the optimal size of bonus relative to contract size (from the performance-based 
contracting examples)? In Uganda, the failure to produce significant benefits of the PBF arm was 
blamed on the size of the bonuses. The maximum performance bonus a facility could receive was 11 
percent of its base grant, or roughly between 5 to 7 percent of its total operating revenue. On 
average most health facilities received bonus payments of less than US$1,000 per year (Morgan 
2010). In Afghanistan, NGOs contracted by three donors could earn a bonus worth 10 percent of the 
World Bank contract value if they reached or exceeded targets outlined in the contract. In Haiti, 
NGOs could earn the final 5 percent of their fixed quarterly payment plus an additional 5 percent if 
all performance targets were achieved. In 2005, this was increased, from 10 to 12 percent. All three 
cases offered a similar proportion, but with different reported effectiveness (and other important 
differences, such as different contract values and different underlying financing systems). 
 
In schemes which pay direct to health workers, again, it is very hard to formulate any rules of thumb 
on the optimal proportion of pay to be derived from P4P payments, given the lack of information 
and the very varied circumstances of health worker starting position and market opportunities. In a 
district-based scheme in Pakistan, staff received an average top-up of 29% of pay ($48 per person 
per month), but this was felt to be inadequate in relation to the opportunity costs of private practice 
foregone (Witter et al. 2011a).  
 
The underlying resourcing contexts and health financing systems varied considerably and were not 
consistently reported. This makes it hard to determine the degree of change which could be 
plausibly be expected from the additional resources which P4P brought to bear. 
Transaction costs 
Concerns have been raised about the cost of administering what is a highly labour intensive 
approach to boosting health service delivery. Donors advocate that administrative costs should be 
kept within a ceiling (ideally less than 25% of budget costs) (Canavan et al. 2008). This was the level 
of overheads for the Rwanda programme (25% of total budget). A multi-country study found costs in 
the range of 15 to 30% of overall expenditure (Toonen et al. 2009). Experience in Rwanda as in other 
countries shows that fund-holder organizations require 4-7 qualified staff to manage a P4P project 
with a target population of 300,000 – 700,000 inhabitants (Canavan et al. 2008). 
 
In relation to donor funding, no analysis was identified in relation to the impact of P4P on the 
transaction costs of aid. There was some expectation that P4P mechanisms – which in theory are 
supposed to be focused on outcomes, not activities – might help to harmonise aid, and to reduce 
reporting. However, no assessment of whether this has materialised was identified. 
 
Cost-effectiveness 
No studies reported on the cost-effectiveness of their intervention. This is clearly one of the most 
significant areas of gap in the literature. Governments have to choose within a wide range of options 
aimed at, for example, boosting their mother and child health indicators, including salary 
supplements, contracting and other performance management measures, P4P, and demand-side 
measures (reducing fees, increasing insurance coverage, vouchers, health equity funds etc.). It is 
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therefore urgent to understand their relative costs and benefits in different contexts and for 
different designs. 
 
In relation to results-based aid modalities, a recent review concludes that ‘value for money will need 
to be carefully monitored. Financial risk can be shifted to agents but this is likely to have cost 
implications and may potentially be at the expense of service delivery for the poorest (e.g. the most 
vulnerable countries are likely to respond worst to CODA)’ (Pearson 2010). 
Sustainability 
 
The programme in Burundi, after its pilot phase with INGOs in 2006-9, has been scaled up 
nationwide (Vinard 2011). It is now funded through the Ministry of Health (it absorbs half of the 
recurrent budget) and by donors (who pay directly to health facilities according to MoH invoices). 
 
In Rwanda, the story is similar – after a pilot phase with INGOs in 2002-6, it has been scaled up 
nationally. The scale-up was part of larger reforms by the Government towards a decentralized 
political and fiscal structure. As part of multi-sectoral agreements on outcomes with district mayors, 
signed in 2007, within the health sector performance incentives would be provided for uptake of 
health insurance, institutional deliveries, family planning, and use of insecticide-treated bed nets 
(Kalk et al. 2010; Sekabaraga et al. 2011). The programme is managed through a strong national 
coordinating body but also decentralised district-based systems (Vinard 2011). The government pays 
a substantial part of health budget through PBF, which is also externally funded. PBF mechanisms 
are now channelling more than 50% of the running costs of public facilities in Rwanda and Burundi 
(Vinard 2011). They remain highly donor-dependent however. 
 
In the DRC, where P4P mechanisms were first used in 2004 in an EU project, there is as yet no 
decision on its wider adoption.   
 
In Tanzania, despite strong government commitment for a national program using P4P for health 
workers, sustainability became a challenge early on because of poor planning and lack of support 
from the donors. The programme was implemented rapidly in 2008-9 but ran into implementation 
problems. Delays in payment to workers because of the refusal of donors to finance the programme 
through the donor-supported “health basket” also created problems. In 2010, the government of 
Tanzania was to enter new talks with the Government of Norway to re-launch the programme 
addressing its weaknesses (Morgan and Eichler 2009). 
 
In Afghanistan there has been government commitment to contract NGOs to provide basic 
healthcare services and most services are delivered through this mechanism. The World Bank, USAID 
and the European Commission have signed performance-based contracts with NGOs. Since there is 
strong government and donor buy-in, the sustainability of this programme is likely (barring 
withdrawal of donor support or another civil war).   
 
In smaller, externally funded and managed schemes, such as the district-based scheme in Pakistan, 
integration and financial sustainability by the local government is a major challenge. The PBI scheme 
in Battagram, for example, cost only $0.68 per person per year, but this represented 44% of the 
annual health budget in the district (Witter et al. 2011a). 
 
In short, the degree of longevity and integration vary – depending on a combination of government 
buy-in; coherence with other strategies; institutional, social-cultural and technical embeddedness; 
good working relations with donors; perceived and documented good results; and continued 
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external support. All on-going P4P programmes documented here continue to be highly dependent 
on external support.  
Observations and lessons learned on design 
 
Defining performance 
Performance is clearly defined in a wide variety of ways in these examples: 
• Performance in the Pakistan project meant, at an individual level, coming to work reliably.  
• For some, such as the IFPS programme in India, it meant a range of activities, including training, 
planning etc. 
• For the large majority of the programmes, it meant maximising specified service outputs (both 
for schemes aimed at individuals, such as the JSY in India and the SDIP in Nepal, but also those 
aimed at facilities).  
• Some combined these with process indicators (drug supply in Zambia and Tanzania; 
management indicators in Nicaragua; quality specifications in all of the central African 
programmes). 
• Only one (the Plan Nacer) included an indicator related to equity (coverage of indigenous 
population). 
Despite the talk of focussing on outcomes, no programmes linked payment to outcomes, for the 
simple reason that these are not within the control of the provider. It is all the more important then 
that the outputs which are incentivised are evidence-based and of good quality (so that the 
expected link to health gains is realised). 
 
Level of targeting of payments 
The targets for P4P will depend on the objectives of the programme. It is not clear from the case 
studies presented here that payments to any particular level or target are more effective in 
principle. Some writers have suggested that payments direct to individuals will be more motivating. 
However, all payments to organisations have cascaded into some form of incentives for staff. 
Further, the general literature on health workers and optimal incentive packages suggests that a mix 
of incentives is likely to be most effective, including non-financial rewards (WHO 2010), which may 
be less likely to crowd out intrinsic motivation. Channelling resources to facilities – the dominant 
approach documented in the studies identified here – can allow for more flexible allocation of funds 
and is more likely to enhance cooperative behaviour. 
 
In a number of cases, P4P funds were also paid to higher level management (district health offices, 
for example, for supervision) and to lower level community health workers. There is no clear 
evidence as yet about how effective these different strategies may be, and this is likely to be highly 
contextual in any case. 
 
Size of payments 
In general, the higher payment and the more that providers control the services, the greater would 
be the expected impact of PBF (Basinga et al. 2010). However, the effects of incentive size are likely 
to depend on a number of other factors too, including how incentives are used and shared with 
staff; starting levels of pay; and the costs relating to increasing outputs. Some conclude that small 
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portion can still motivate change, e.g. 10% of income (Eichler and De 2008). A study in the 
Philippines (focussed on curative care for children) found showed little difference in terms of quality 
between a group of physicians who were provided a 15% direct bonus and a second group who 
received a 5% indirect bonus where facilities were reimbursed against targets. On average, each 
treatment group saw a 10% increase in quality (Peabody et al. 2011). In Mali, a 40-50% addition to 
pay was judged necessary to motivate in one project, whereas in Ghana it was decided that a 15% 
increase on staff take-home revenues would motivate them – these differences being based on the 
lower level of basic pay in Mali (Toonen and Van der Wal, 2012). In Haiti, a bonus of 10% appears to 
have motivated providers, whereas in Argentina, a full 40% of payments were linked to 
performance.   
 
How payments are calculated 
It appears that P4P is being used in very different ways in different contexts – in some as a payment 
mechanism, linked to actual service costs, and in others as marginal top-up to motivate providers 
and to fund some recurrent costs at facility level. In most cases, facilities remain dependent for a 
substantial part of their funding on complementary sources (‘input-based financing’), not just for 
investment but also running costs. In some schemes (e.g. Burundi) a mix of approaches has been 
taken, with some services more highly funded than others (e.g. HIV), which can lead to distortions. In 
Rwanda, hospitals are given a budget based on the unit costs of planned activities, with marginal 
top-ups related to quality, which is a more stable system. In DRC, payments were apparently 
originally related to costs, but these diminished as the budget came under strain, leading to an 
underfunding of vertical programmes such as TB (Vinard 2011). 
 
There does not yet appear to be a consensus on how P4P payments should be calculated. The 
budget ceiling is as likely to dictate rates as evidence of how much is needed to motivate or fund 
change. It is a non-trivial exercise to be able to set payments at the right level to avoid excessive or 
deficient incentives, given that real costs will vary across actors and over time, and taking into 
account the often complex funding flows. As coverage changes, marginal costs to providers change, 
and so payments need to be adjusted, especially for P4P programmes which pay per service. Such 
systems will also need to build in cost control measures over time – experience in other settings 
indicates that they are likely to have inflationary tendencies, unless well managed.  
 
Another consideration is transparency. Many systems involve complex weighting of indicators, which 
make final payments hard for actors to understand. 
 
For payments made direct to staff, these can be made flat rate, per item or as a proportion of 
salaries. In the Pakistan PBI scheme, payment was made as a proportion of salary, which rewards top 
staff disproportionately. However, it appeared to be accepted as fair (maybe in part because the 
decision rule was at least clear) (Witter et al. 2011a). 
 
Number of targets 
Is there any learning from these examples about how many targets are optimal? The USAID P4P 
project in South Sudan had 50, which was seen as too great by project implementers. Rwanda paid 
for 14 output indicators, but also used a quality scoring system based on a further 13 services 
(incorporating structural and process dimensions). The trade-off between avoiding distortions (by 
including a wide range of services) and operating a manageable and comprehensible system (by 
keeping it simple) requires a difficult judgement. 
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Payment systems 
A mix of payment systems are shown by the examples in this paper. Some are close to traditional 
contracts, with the main penalty being failure to renew if targets are not met (as was the case in 
Cambodia, for example). Others operate a fee for episode payment system (the most common 
approach). Others again offer small bonuses to be won (or lost) if targets are met, with the main 
payment fixed.  
 
It is generally recognised that there is no perfect payment system, and this is borne out by the range 
of approaches tried by these different programmes. Payment by service rewards those who are able 
to operate efficiently (if payments are flat-rate, as in the central African schemes). Payment 
according to relative improvement rewards those who start with low coverage. Payment according 
to absolute thresholds (as used in Zambia and Tanzania) rewards high performers. Some of the 
ongoing impact evaluations are seeking to test different types of targets (see 
http://www.rbfhealth.org/project/our-projects for summary of impact evaluation designs).  
 
Two types of design options for setting targets have been shown to produce disappointing results, 
according to Eichler and De (2008): (1) a uniform threshold applicable for all P4P participants (for 
example, everyone must reach 90 percent full immunization coverage) and (2) following a 
“tournament model,” where those in, say, the top 75th percentile of performance receive the bonus. 
They recommend setting targets according to the baseline position of each unit (proportionate 
increases in coverage, with diminishing proportions as coverage rises). This approach is clearly only 
applicable for preventive interventions and interventions where coverage can be measured. 
 
In most cases, there will be a need for continuous revision of targets to avoid perverse effects. In the 
Haiti experience, the selection of performance indicators was revised in each phase. 
 
In relation to frequency of payments, it is generally assumed that more frequent payments are 
better in terms of linking rewards with activities. Most programmes pay monthly or quarterly.  
Verification 
A critical element of P4P is accountability. Since payments are tied to specific targets being met, 
some form of independent monitoring and evaluation needs to be established. Many schemes try to 
engage civil society organisations in third party monitoring but this is not always easy to achieve 
(Vinard 2011). Ad hoc data collection remains necessary, although this is a costly process and does 
not necessarily contribute to strengthening the routine health information systems. In Afghanistan, 
for example, the monitoring and evaluation is contracted out to Johns Hopkins University and the 
Indian Institute of Health Management Research. The M&E is conducted through nationwide annual 
household surveys and semi-annual facility-based inspections (Sondorp et al. 2009).  
 
Service or target type 
P4P has tended to focus on infectious diseases and on reproductive and child health services, at 
least in low and middle income countries. As it typically incentivises greater activity, target indicators 
have focussed on preventive care and on the package of care which is believed to be linked to better 
outcomes. Quality of care has to be factored in to avoid perverse effects (iatrogenic infections etc.). 
Services which are easily defined and measured are obviously necessary, and should be prioritised 
based on the local burden of disease and the areas of underperformance.  
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In order to avoid undue focus on limited activities, payments which reward provision of a continuum 
of care are important, particularly in maternal health, where certain aspects such as family planning, 
post-natal care and neonatal care have tended to be neglected (Morgan et al. 2011).  
 
Most of the programmes have focussed on the primary care sector, or on ‘basic health services’. This 
relates to the desirable characteristics identified above. Paying individuals for performance in a 
hospital setting is particularly difficult, as quality of care depends crucially on team-work within and 
between teams.  Performance of hospital staff or teams is complex and difficult to measure in a 
balanced way that captures all dimensions – such as the need for hospitals to continuously prioritise 
an unpredictable volume of urgent cases while maintaining progress on planned activities (Hawkins 
2011). 
 
Stand-alone or linked to demand-side measures 
Most countries in these examples are experimenting with a range of supply- and demand-side 
reforms. These are necessarily very context-specific: no optimal package can be derived. However, a 
number of countries are combining incentives to providers with reduced access costs for clients (e.g. 
Burundi and Sierra Leone, which are both removing fees for under-fives and pregnant women, while 
also introducing P4P). As both stimulate utilisation, a substantial response can be anticipated and 
should be carefully managed to avoid capacity constraints, quality reduction, and budgetary short-
falls. 
 
Another risk, illustrated in countries like Cambodia, is that the plethora of financing mechanisms on 
supply- and demand-side can end up creating confusion about which cost elements are funded by 
which channels, what overall resources are being received at facility level, and what the main 
commissioning tools are (Hawkins 2011).   
 
Purchasing arrangements 
One rationale for PBF is that it can offer the opportunity to build a financing institution, independent 
from political risk, which can mobilize other local and external resources (including insurance 
premiums), and to adequately involve civil society (as social security systems do in most OECD 
countries). However, building up an independent purchaser is a challenging juridical exercise, 
requiring sensitive political compromise between stakeholders (Vinard 2011). In most cases 
described here, purchasing was either done by external organisations (donors and funders) or by the 
Ministry of Health. In Rwanda and Burundi, for example, there is no separation of regulator from 
purchaser, or indeed provider – a system which is more efficient, but leaves providers reliant on the 
Treasury for their cash flow. 
Implementation lessons 
 
It goes without saying that poor implementation will undermine the effectiveness of a P4P – as any 
other – programme. Failure to mobilise necessary support, delays in negotiating contracts, funding 
delays, lack of clarity on roles, all of these have been documented in some P4P programmes and 
have been linked to disappointing results (Morgan 2010, Morgan 2010a). Steps for designing and 
implementing P4P programmes have been described in a number of reports (for example, Eichler 
2006, Toonen and Van der Wal 2012, Soeters 2013). 
 
As with any reform, effective communication with stakeholders is a prerequisite for success. If 
reforms are too rapid, if stakeholders are not well informed, if details relating to implementation are 
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not provided, then implementation is likely to be poor. These problems were documented in 
Tanzania (Morgan and Eichler 2009) and also in DRC, where a study found no evidence of 
programme effectiveness, which was attributed to a number of factors, including the failure to boost 
staff income regularly, and the fact that health workers were not well informed about the 
programme and the performance criteria (Fox et al. 2013). 
Application in different contexts 
 
Some commentators have suggested that P4P has worked better in post-conflict settings (Toonen et 
al. 2009).  If this is the case, a number of reasons could be hypothesized – that there is less inertia in 
the system; that providers have lost some of their intrinsic motivation and are therefore more 
amenable to financial incentives; that control mechanisms are weak and therefore need to be 
replaced by other levers; that central funding may have broken down in any case, leaving providers 
open to market failures etc. P4P has certainly been applied actively in fragile and post-conflict states, 
and that presumably relates, at least in part, to a vacuum in regular services and donors filling 
government functions, at least for a transitional period.  
 
On the other hand, if the context is too hostile, then it is unreasonable to expect implementers to 
achieve significant increases in outputs. This was a point made by implementers in Southern Sudan, 
who faced penalties for not meeting targets, which they felt were unreasonable given the many 
challenges of the nascent health system (Morgan 2010a). Problems listed included lack of access by 
the population, shortages of staff, poor staff pay, and drugs supply problems. These were 
exacerbated by process issues, such as lack of consultation on targets, targets being measured too 
frequently, and issues of credibility of baseline data (Morgan 2010a).  
 
A related point was made in relation to the Tanzania programme. ‘Performance-based funding at the 
district level will, for instance, not fully address the challenges related to poor transport 
infrastructure, delayed supplies of drugs and equipment from the central level, the shortage of 
health workers in general, and the shortage of people trained for emergency obstetric care in 
particular. Nor is there any reason to believe that performance-based funding will improve those 
aspects of the quality of the service that are difficult to observe for both clients and supervisors’ 
(Maestad 2007). 
Organisational requirements 
 
Quite serious reforms are required to make PBF work: ‘Usually, provider management and 
accounting systems need to be strengthened, purchasing capacity improved, performance and 
quality standards established, and adequate provider reporting and information systems introduced 
to allow for appropriate performance monitoring and transparency’ (Brenzel and Naimoli 2009). 
 
Major areas for capacity building by NGOs within the pilot projects included: (i) strategic planning (ii) 
cost and revenue analysis (iii) determining client perceptions of quality of services (iv) models of 
staff organization and utilization and (v) information systems and human resource management 
(Canavan et al. 2008). 
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Key skills and tools include contracting (often at several layers); business planning (for providers); 
monitoring (for purchasers); and regulatory skills3. Practical issues such as whether facilities all have 
bank accounts are also important factors to take into account. 
 
The link with decentralisation and community participation continues to be debated. Although a 
degree of local oversight is desirable, there was no documentation in these schemes of increased 
community participation as a result of PBF (or as a requirement of it). A recent study of the topic 
found that PBF does not automatically imply more ‘voice’ from the population, but introduces an 
interesting complement to health committees (Falisse et al. 2012). Some point out that the main 
country to take PBF to scale is Rwanda, which has done so with a centralised system (Toonen et al. 
2009).  
Discussion and some outstanding questions 
 
P4P is an idea which in practice covers a range of modalities - it is hard to discuss them all within the 
same category. At its borders, it overlaps with other approaches and bodies of literature on 
contracting, provider payment systems, purchasing and health worker incentives. This paper has 
discussed the core concept while also reflecting on the diversity of experiences of P4P. 
 
P4P approaches have spread quickly in the past decade, and it is interesting to consider the factors 
behind this. One is undoubtedly that it has intuitive appeal as a concept. Secondly, it has garnered a 
high degree of support from a number of influential multi- and bilateral donors (the World Bank, 
USAID, Government of Norway, and, to a lesser extent AusAid and DFID). It has also found a 
successful case study in Rwanda. Finally, it meets the needs of an era where the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) are driving forward a target-oriented approach to health and 
development. This does however raise the question of how P4P will fare after 2015, when targets 
and also the resources behind those targets will change. 
 
Some argue that P4P should be evaluated not only on the increase of a few indicators, but much 
more on its capacity to catalyse reform and to address structural problems (Vinard 2011). As this 
report has shown, there is little evidence of it transforming health systems to date. In Rwanda, it has 
been linked with decentralization and other reforms, but the direction of change is not clear – did 
Rwanda reform because it was introducing PBF, or (as seems more plausible) did it introduce PBF 
because there was already a wider agenda for change at the political level? The process of its 
development and introduction will influence how it operates (Witter et al. 2013) and it is important 
to understand how it affects different institutional actors and the wider political economy, which is 
another neglected area in the literature. 
 
Other questions relating to health systems remain, including whether the use of P4P mechanisms 
add coherence to the health financing system in most LMIC countries, or is it adding to their 
fragmentation. The picture varies, but certainly in some countries it is adding to a complex mix of 
incentive regimes, with some countries operating a range of small- and large-scale P4P programmes. 
Cambodia’s health sector experience to date, for example, with various devices for linking staff pay 
to performance have suffered from (i) fragmentation and a lack of a coherent and consistent set of 
rules governing such practices; (ii) a lack of oversight and monitoring of the implementation of the 
schemes, particularly at the level of individual staff; and (iii) absence of any rigorous evaluation of 
the effectiveness of such performance-related pay practices, in spite of widespread “piloting” 
                                                           
3
 Some very practical tools such as sample contracts can be found at: 
https://nphcda.thenewtechs.com/documents.html. 
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(Hawkins 2011). It seems clear that P4P needs to be one approach within the overall health financing 
strategy – integrated with other tools and used as part of overall strategy and with broader national 
plans. It will have implications for national pay policies, for example, in other sectors. 
 
It is also important to consider whether P4P is effective at getting funding to the frontline. One of 
the critiques of traditional budgeting is that funds tend to be absorbed at higher levels and fail to 
reach front-line providers. It is possible (but not yet investigated) that P4P might be a more effective 
approach to ensuring that health centres, for example, have adequate operating funds. The benefits 
and costs should be carefully examined, compared with other approaches (such as the direct facility 
funding approach piloted in Kenya (Opwora et al. 2009).  
 
Its effect over time is another important area for investigation. Rapid improvements were noted 
during the start up of some P4P programmes but later payments became integral with health worker 
remuneration, which may lead to a levelling off or even a decline in performance over time, if there 
is no variation in payments (Toonen et al. 2009). Countries like the UK which have piloted a range of 
incentive schemes found that output/target payments tend to be cost inflationary: after 
achievement of performance targets, staff expect to continue to receive the incentive payment for 
maintaining the target.  So the incentive is often incorporated into base pay, requiring further 
increases in pay for any new performance targets. 
 
It is not always clear whether P4P intended is intended to be a long-term approach (a new funding 
channel) or a temporary strategy, to change organisational culture. This was not discussed in the 
papers identified here and yet is a critical question which will determine how it should be 
operationalized and monitored. 
 
The five-year evaluation of the Global Fund concluded that ‘performance-based financing, a key 
tenet of the guiding principles, has evolved into a complex and burdensome system that has thus far 
focused more on project inputs and outputs than on development outcomes, departing from the 
vision of an outcome-based model’. This has been an issue for most P4P programmes, which may 
aim to reward outcomes but in fact involve paying for outputs and often quite closely specified 
processes too. 
 
P4P will work best when there is spare capacity in the health system, such that small additional 
resources can leverage a large increase in outputs. Where this is not the case – where it motivates 
more activity but the system is already under strain – then the effects on quality of care are likely to 
be negative. Few of the studies examined here appeared to start with a clear assessment of what 
capacity constraints the system faced prior to P4P. 
 
Being contrarian, it could be argued that health care producers need to be less output-oriented and 
more process-oriented (focussing on the quality of care and on how patients are treated, which is 
within their control, rather than on results, which are not). The health care system is peculiar in that 
it has many process goals, as well as outcome goals. Qualities such as empathy and listening skills 
from the health worker side form an important part of the healing process, but it is not easy to buy 
these. In higher income settings such as the UK, there is evidence that focus on targets has 
detracted in some cases from patient-centred care and the patient-clinician relationship (Oxman et 
al. 2007). 
 
P4P in LMICs appears to be developing under its own dynamic but is perhaps not drawing enough on 
experience in OECD countries. Evidence from countries like the UK suggest that while the pay for 
performance framework produced rapid changes in behaviour, particularly with respect to 
improvements in processes, it was costly, the relation between performance targets and population 
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health improvements was not clear, and there was evidence that setting targets for some areas 
reduced performance in other areas of the service (Maynard & Bloor 2010).  
 
An OECD study on performance-related pay (at the individual level) in the public sector was not 
encouraging. ‘Performance pay is an appealing idea, but the experiences reviewed in this study 
indicate that its implementation is complex and difficult. Previous OECD studies on the impact of 
performance pay at the managerial level concluded that many of the schemes had failed to satisfy 
key motivational requirements for effective performance pay, because of design and 
implementation problems, but also because performance assessment is inherently difficult in the 
public sector..... Performance measurement in the public sector requires a large element of 
managerial judgement. The notion of performance itself is complex, owing to the difficulty of finding 
suitable quantitative indicators and because performance objectives often change with government 
policy. Many studies have concluded that the impact of PRP on performance is limited, and can in 
fact be negative’ (OECD 2005). A systematic review of economic evaluations of pay for performance 
in the health sector (which only picked up studies from higher income countries) concluded that 
evidence was scarce and inconclusive, that P4P efficiency could not be demonstrated and that 
further research was required (Emmert et al. 2012).  
 
There are few examples of public organisations in the OECD countries having withdrawn their 
performance-related pay policy (New Zealand being an exception). But the fact that organisations do 
not withdraw is not necessarily a very good indication of its effectiveness, because the costs of doing 
so are a deterrent (OECD 2005). Once entrenched, it can be hard to reform. 
 
There has been a consensus for some time about the desirability of increased autonomy for 
providers, and also about the need for accountability and demonstration of results. Whether paying 
according to those results is more effective than more general performance management is an 
important question. P4P is a part of a wider ‘managing for results’ approach, which emphasises the 
need for explicit specification of objectives, the measurement of performance against those 
objectives, and the setting of performance targets. Some of these may link resources to targets, but 
more in the sense of making targets credible (ensuring resources are there to allow targets to be 
met, rather than paying for them retrospectively).  
 
The usual direction of reform for individual employees as systems mature involves the consolidation 
of incentives into basic pay, and encouraging performance through the career system and through 
promotion of performance management and accountability systems focused on job 
descriptions/agreements and annual performance reviews. 
 
There are also insights to be gained from wider literature on motivation. P4P is based on the 
economic agency theory. However, behavioural economics suggests that our behaviour is more 
complex than rational theories recognise. It emphasises the importance of social relations – of 
norms, perceptions of fairness and social rewards. This fits with insights from industrial psychology 
and literature on intrinsic motivation, especially in public service. At the least, they suggest that a 
combination of material and non-material rewards is likely to be more productive than material 
alone.  
 
The extent to which financial incentives crowd out or in intrinsic motivation may depend to a large 
extent on the manner of their introduction – whether they are seen as recognising/rewarding effort, 
rather than as controlling/indicating a lack of trust in the agent (Myers 2008).  
 
In general, tight performance management is good for poor performers but can demoralise good 
ones (it can limit their flexibility and creativity) – the knights and knaves hypothesis. This was 
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supported by a recent study in an NHS hospital, which found that the introduction of high powered 
incentives and tighter management controls was linked to a reduction in additional hours worked by 
more altruistic doctors and an increase by those who were less altruistic (Ensor et al. 2009)4. The 
incentive regime therefore needs to reflect the characteristics of the workforce. It could aim to 
differentiate, but applying different extrinsic incentives to different sections of a workforce in one 
organisation is likely to increase transactions costs (and possibly labour costs) and cause friction. This 
raises the question of whether health workers in LMICs are more knightly than knavish, and, indeed, 
whether they simply lack working conditions to facilitate good practices. 
 
A modelling of incentive regimes to check shirkers without demotivating high performers concluded 
that the regime should combine two elements – intensive monitoring to persuade the shirking 
physicians to improve their performance but also non-pecuniary rewards and recognition to counter 
the deleterious effect of increased supervision for the high performers (Garcia-Prado 2005). 
Operational research in Zambia also concluded that ‘Non-financial awards are as motivating, if not 
more motivating, for staff than financial awards and do not generate as much conflict, suspicion, or 
frustration’ (Furth 2006). Studies of the effects of P4P at the individual level need to take account of 
selection effects over time (the kinds of workers who are attracted to work under these regimes) as 
well as cross-sectional motivation and effort effects (Gerhart & Fang 2013). 
 
At the international level, P4P (and its affiliate of ‘cash on delivery’ aid) is sometimes presented as 
offering a new and liberating of doing business between donors and governments. Conditionality 
based originally on project goals and then on macro/policy demands is now replaced with a focus on 
outcomes (with governments free to determine how these are reached). However, some question 
the extent to which ‘Value for Money’ (VFM) agenda equates to good development practice and 
encourages national leadership and accountability5. Is it about buying results for donors, or is it 
indeed, as some argue, related to proving the purpose of aid to domestic audiences in developed 
countries6? 
 
The compatibility of P4P approaches with the Paris Declaration also needs consideration. In relation 
to global health initiatives, governments often have a limited ability to negotiate on targets and in 
some cases (e.g. the Global Fund) parallel operating systems are required. 
 
Donor policy-conditionality (such as budget support, linked to poverty-reduction goals) is a form of 
performance-related pay, even if not normally bracketed under that. The difference is that it is often 
linked to intermediate actions, such as government commitments, and leaves more flexibility to take 
into account factors which may have influenced non-performance (Pearson 2010). 
Conclusions 
 
P4P has spread quickly in the health sector in low- and middle-income countries over the past 
decade. It has been deployed in relation to two groups of services in particular – control of infectious 
diseases and sexual, reproductive and child health services. This paper focuses on experiences of the 
latter, though many of the lessons will be shared across the two groups. The paper has 
demonstrated the range of approaches which use a performance-based component, including global 
health initiatives (though these are not specifically focussed on SHR services), performance-based 
                                                           
4
 Management reforms in the mid-2000s in the hospital were found to have improved productivity, with a 
small increase in costs (from 2% to 3% of overall expenditure being absorbed by management). 
5
 See http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Busan-High-Level-Forum/Value-for-money-or-Results-Obsession-
Disorder for example 
6
  See http://www.owen.org/blog/3275 , for example 
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contracting of NGOs, performance-based funding of local government, facility funding, and health 
worker incentive schemes.  
 
The field is changing fast, so not all experiences can be captured, but based on a literature review 
some of the main documented programmes were described (25 in total). Evidence of their impact 
was assessed, based on a conceptual framework of the ultimate and intermediate goals of P4P.  
 
It is clear that P4P can have a positive influence on health outputs, at least in some contexts, and in 
the short term. However, there are a number of important areas which remain to be better 
understood. These include: 
• the long-term impact of P4P, if P4P is intended as a long-term financing mechanism as opposed 
to a short-term behaviour modifier 
• its health systems impact, particularly in terms of: 
o  integration/fragmentation of financing channels 
o  effectiveness of purchasing arrangements 
o information systems 
o pay policy 
o non-targeted services (and how adverse effects can be controlled) 
o capacity building 
o governance arrangements 
• its impact on health outcomes, which study designs have not yet been able to reveal 
• its equity effects and impact on patient payments 
• analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the approach, particularly related to alternative methods of 
achieving similar goals (wider performance management tools; increasing provider autonomy; 
direct facility funding; pay reforms) 
• its sustainability, given the high degree of donor dependence to date (financial and technical) 
and also the focus on short-term MDG goals, which will change after 2015 
• its strengths and weaknesses as a mechanism for international aid, especially in terms of 
consistency with the Paris Declaration and its impact on aid harmonisation and transactions 
costs 
• how to increase its efficiency – particularly reducing the high overhead costs recorded in most 
schemes to date 
• its effects on health workers’ motivation and behaviour (in the LMIC setting), and how to 
maintain motivation over longer periods of time 
• a better understanding of the contextual factors favouring the use of P4P, including in relation to 
the process of its introduction, and to the necessary systems capacity prior to introduction 
• learning on design issues, such as how to design payment systems to minimise inflationary 
tendencies and promote quality of care, how to effectively incorporate non-monetary rewards, 
as well as on the magnitude of payments required to motivate in different settings 
The overall evidence base remains weak, though it is growing. Schemes in LMICs should learn from 
and feed into lessons generated in higher income settings and in related literature sets on aid 
effectiveness, performance management, contracting, provider payment systems and health worker 
incentives and motivation. As P4P programmes mature, it is likely that they will be seen less as a 
stand-alone strategy and more as part of a range of purchasing and performance management 
approaches. Development and monitoring of P4P should also take a broader perspective, starting 
from a sound understanding of context and systems. 
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Table 1A Description of P4P schemes 
Programme 
Year                        
implemented 
Scale of implementation Description of P4P intervention Services targeted Authors 
PAYMENTS TO GOVERNMENTS 
Global Fund 
to fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
(GFATM) 
2001 
onwards 
Global - multiple countries (136) Performance based grants to countries 
through public-private partnerships.  
Health services related to prevention and 
treatment of malaria, TB, and HIV/AIDS 
Macro 
International 
2009 
Global 
Alliance on 
Vaccine 
Initiative 
(GAVI) -HSS 
window 
2005 
onwards (HSS 
window) 
Global - multiple countries 
(commitments to 44; disbursements 
to 36 so far for HSS) 
Payments to governments aimed at Health 
System Strengthening. Governments 
develop proposals and present to GAVI. 
Funding is linked to targeted outputs. 
Immunizations and related child and maternal 
care 
HLSP 2009;  
www.gavi 
alliance.org 
PAYMENTS TO MID LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs, local government) 
Family Health 
programme, 
Brazil 
1994 
onwards 
National Municipalities face negative incentives if 
targets are not met - their future funding is 
reduced and remedial measures are put in 
place to improve performance. Later pilot 
with performance bonuses of up to 15% if 
targets met 
Basic health care services including maternal 
and child healthcare.  
Hecht et al. 
2004; Harris 
2010 
Plan Nacer in 
Argentina 
2004 
onwards 
National  Payments made from central government 
to provinces, and provinces pay providers. 
Providers reimbursed a monthly base fee 
(60% ) on the basis of FFS for agreed 
services. This is determined by the number 
of eligible enrollees in Plan Nacer. 
Remaining 40% provided as a 
"complementary transfer”, determined by 
the achievement of stated targets for ten 
output and outcome health indicators.  
MNCH package includes 80 services to 
pregnant women and mothers (up to 45 days 
after delivery), and to children under the age 
of 6 not covered by health insurance. 10 
indicators for performance are: (i) timely 
inclusion of women for ANC , (ii) Effective 
neonatal/delivery care (Apgar Score), (iii) 
Effective prenatal care and premature birth 
prevention (weight above 2.5kg), (iv) Quality 
prenatal and delivery care (mothers 
immunised and tested for STD), (v) Medical 
auditing maternal and infant deaths, (vi) 
Immunization coverage (measles), (vii) Sexual 
and reproductive health care, (viii) Well child 
care (<1 year), (ix) Well child care (1-6 years 
old), (x) Inclusion of Indigenous Population. 
Naimoli & 
Vergeer 
2010; Eichler 
& Glassman 
2008 
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Programme Year                        Scale of implementation Description of P4P intervention Services targeted Authors 
Innovations 
in Family 
Planning 
Services, 
Uttar 
Pradesh India 
1992 
onwards 
State of Uttar Pradesh  Performance based disbursement of 
funding from USAID to Indian registered 
“society,” the State Innovations in FP 
Services Project Agency (SIFPSA). SIFPSA in 
turn contracts public sector and NGOs for 
provision of services (this is done on cost 
reimbursement and does not include PBF 
elements).  
Overall focus on improving access to and 
utilization of services. Since inception, 
program has expanded services targeted over 
3 phases: Phase 1 (1994-2002): focus on 
strengthening government hospitals, district 
action plans, clinical trainings, IEC activities, 
and contraceptive social marketing; Phase 2 
(2004-09): focus on larger reproductive 
health services in addition to FP; Phase 3 
(2009-2012): focus on HSS, evaluating PPPs, 
training and human capacity building, and 
behavior change communication 
 
USAID 2010 
Output-
based 
payments in 
Haiti 
1999 
onwards 
Initially 3 NGOs, and later expanded 
to 25 NGOs by 2005, providing basic 
health services to 2.7 million people 
Contracting out of services to NGOs - 
USAID-funded project initiated in 1999 
Targets focused on service delivery included: 
ANC (at least 3 visits), full immunization by 
age 1, reduced discontinuation of oral and 
injectable FP methods, post natal visits, 
assisted deliveries, children weighed and 
enrolled in nutritional recuperation. 
Additional management targets included 
commodities supply management, timely 
reporting, following guidelines for financial 
management, human resources management 
and essentials drugs logistics, strengthening 
organizational structure, implementation of 
management audit recommendations, and 
use of CORE (Cost and Revenue Analysis Tool) 
Eichler et al. 
2007 
Contracting 
of Health 
Services Pilot 
Project, 
Cambodia 
1998-2003 5 districts - 3 contracting in and 2 
contracting out 
Performance based contracting, with two 
variants (contracting in and out). 
Contracting in districts were expected to 
work within the government structure and 
use their personnel, supply chain, etc. 
Contracting out districts had full authority 
over their management, hirings, 
procurement.  
 
Delivery of a minimum package of services for 
maternal and child health: childhood 
immunization, administration of vitamin A to 
children, antenatal care for pregnant women, 
child delivery by a  trained professional, 
delivery in a health facility, the knowledge 
and use of birth control, and use of public 
facilities when seeking curative care 
Bloom et al. 
2007 
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Performance-
based 
contracting 
in the DRC 
2002 
onwards 
85 health zones covering 10 million 
people (~15% of the total 
population), at least in expanded 
phase since 2008 
PBC through IDA-financed multi-sectoral 
project with 10 international and national 
church-based NGOs, who channel 
resources and technical resources to the 
health zones 
 
 
Family planning, maternal and child health, 
outpatient utilization 
Johannes et 
al. 2008 
Paying NGOs 
for 
performance 
in 
Afghanistan 
2003 
onwards 
8 provinces with NGO contracts and 
3 with contracts with MoPH 
Performance-based contracting of NGOs to 
provide basic services. World Bank 
contracts NGOs in three provinces, via 
Ministry of Public Health. USAID also has 
contracts with NGOs, but negative 
incentives (payment is withheld if targets 
are not met). Proposed changes from 2006 
onwards with incentive being extension of 
contract for an additional 2.5 years. 
European Commission contracts with 
NGOs and sets targets but no PBF element 
 
 
Basic package of services (including MNCH) Sondorp et 
al. 2009 
Pay for 
performance 
in South 
Sudan 
2005 
onwards 
No information given Performance based contracts with three 
lead agencies (international organisations) 
Basic health services including maternal and 
child health. Maternal health indicators 
include ANC, assisted deliveries, PNC 
 
 
Morgan 
2011 
Performance 
based 
contracting 
in Liberia 
2009 
onwards 
105 health facilities in 7 counties 
funded under the 5-year RBHS 
project;  
Performance based contracting with 
NGOS: Rebuilding Basic Health Services 
programme contracts NGOs which provide 
management support to health facilities. 
Performance incentives initially included a 
6% payment only but later revised to 
include in-kind payments as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic health care package including maternal 
health: family planning, facility based 
deliveries, ante-natal and post-natal care, HIV 
counselling and treatment 
Brennan et 
al. 2010; 
Morgan 
2011 
PAYMENTS TO FACILITIES 
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Pay for 
Performance 
in Rwanda 
2006 
onwards 
(with pilot 
initiated 
earlier) 
80 facilities  as part of national scale 
up of services initiated in 2006 
Pay for performance (P4P)  - payments 
made directly to primary level health 
facilities according to targeted services 
delivered 
MNCH related services, with performance 
measured against 14 indicators related to 
service delivery, and weighted for quality. 
Payment varies for different services. For the 
health sector as a whole, the President has 
signed contracts with district mayors, 
focusing on the following performance 
indicators: (a) the number of people adhering 
to health insurance; (b) the number of 
institutional deliveries; (c) the number of 
women using family planning methods; and 
(d) the use of insecticide-treated bed nets.  
Basinga et al 
2011; 
Basinga et 
al. 2010; 
Sekabaraga 
et al  2011; 
Kalk et al 
2010 
Performance-
based 
financing in 
DRC 
2006 
onwards 
2 districts in DRC: 39 health centres 
and 4 hospitals 
Performance-based contracting with 
health facilities. Autonomous health 
facilities managers invited to submit 
business plans on a quarterly basis to 
purchasing authority. Funds used for 
recruiting and motivating staff, social 
marketing, rehabilitating infrastructure, 
developing subcontracts with private 
providers and purchasing drugs. Facility 
managers had the authority to negotiate 
user fees with communities  
Participating health centres received 
subsidies for 16 indicators, including use of 
oral or injectable contraceptives by women, 
facility-based births, outpatient visits, number 
of bed days, and full immunization of children 
by age 1 year. Hospitals received subsidies for 
22 general indicators and 8 HIV/AIDS 
indicators.  
Soeters et 
al. 2011 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Burundi 
2006 
onwards 
Piloted in 2006 in 3 provinces, with 
national scale up beginning in 2009 
on a roll out basis (initially covering 6 
additional provinces) 
PBF payments to facilities in selected 
districts - piloted initially with support 
from INGOs from 2006, and then scaled up 
from 2009.  Quantitative and qualitative 
indicators are used.  Quality is monitored 
through service-specific composite 
indicators. Pilot programmes assessed 
quality on a quarterly basis, with a bonus 
of up to 15% of score on quantitative 
results during the same time period. Under 
the scale up, the MoH is raising this bonus 
to 25%.  
Basic health services, including outpatient 
visits; family planning; and maternal and child 
healthcare (among others) 
Busogoro & 
Beith 2010; 
Toonen et 
al. 2009 
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CORDAID Pay 
for 
Performance 
pilot project 
in Tanzania 
2006-2008 64 church health facilities in five 
dioceses, comprising of 13 hospitals, 
12 health centres and 39 
dispensaries  supported by Cordaid 
(evaluation limited to 3 of 5 diocese) 
Pay for performance pilot, managed by 
CORDAID, funding selected diocese - part 
fixed budget upfront, part in relation to 
hitting targets for five core indicators 
Outpatient and inpatient utilization of 
services; supervised deliveries; new VCT 
clients; and drug management (also measure 
ANC) 
Canavan & 
Swai 2008 
Performance-
based 
contracting 
in Uganda, 
2003-6 
2003-2006 Experiment in 5 districts covering 
118 facilities (68 PNFPs) 
Performance-based contracting to PNFP 
facilities. Two different interventions: 
treatment group B: base grant from 
government but with freedom on how to 
spend it; treatment group C was also 
awarded bonuses, in addition to base 
grant and freedom on how to spend it.  
Outpatient utilization, maternal and child 
health, family planning 
Morgan 
2010 
Performance-
based 
Contracting 
Pilot, 
Nicaragua 
2000 
onwards 
6 hospitals - pilot programme Performance contracts with hospitals There are 4 categories under which bonus is 
provided, which are: service targets, 
management , quality and organization of 
services 
Jack 2003 
Pay for 
Performance, 
Egypt 
2001 
onwards 
5 governorates Incentives given to providers for services 
delivered against set targets.  
Primary healthcare, including maternal and 
child care 
El-Saharty et 
al. 2010 
Pay for 
Performance 
Pilot in 
Zambia 
2007 
onwards 
5 mission hospitals and later 3 
mission health centres 
Mission facilities paid for meeting targets 
(50% of funding is fixed; 50% conditional 
on targets). Four targets used, each with 
equal weight and set at same level for all 
facilities 
Inpatient turnover; facility based deliveries; 
VCT user rate; drug supply 
Vergeer & 
Collins 2008 
Performance-
based Grants 
for 
Reproductive 
Health in the 
Philippines 
(PBG1) 
 
 
2008 
onwards 
Unclear. Brief discusses examples 
from 4 provinces.  
PBG-1 are incentivised grants aimed at 
funding FP and RH programmes by local 
governments.  
Pregnancy related care and family planning  WHO 2011 
PAYMENTS TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Tanzania 
2008-2010 National Performance-based incentive paid to 
health workers against achieving specific 
results 
Maternal and child health (MDGs 4 and 5), 
which for maternal health includes facility 
based births and intermittent preventative 
Morgan and 
Eichler 2009 
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treatment 2 for pregnant women.  
Performance-
based Grants 
for 
Reproductive 
Health in the 
Philippines 
(PBG2) 
2008 
onwards 
Unclear, but appears to be on wide 
scale across provinces. Brief only 
discusses examples from 4 
provinces.  
 PBG-2  are direct performance-based 
grants aimed at TBAs, CHW, midwives to 
direct women to facilities for ANC and 
birth. PBG-2 also include demand side 
incentives. 
Pregnancy related care and family planning  WHO 2011 
Cambodia 
Midwifery 
Allowance 
2007 
onwards 
National Incentives to midwives for facility based 
births 
Maternal and child health, with a focus on 
facility based deliveries   
Hawkins 
2011; 
Murakami 
2009 
Battagram 
P4P project, 
Pakistan, 
Save the 
Children 
2008-2010 District level intervention in 
Battagram (North Western Frontier 
Province) 
Performance-based incentives (PBI) to 
government employed health facility 
workers. These health workers covered 
under the project were eligible to receive 
an additional 20-35% of their pay based on 
performance. Health workers directly 
employed by Save the Children were not 
eligible for the bonus, but received higher 
payments.  
Basic health services including maternal and 
child health. Maternal health included ANC, 
TT2, assisted deliveries, PNC 
Witter et al. 
2011 
Safe Delivery 
Incentive 
Program, 
Nepal  
2005 
onwards 
National The SDIP is a CCT programme with a PBF 
component for health workers. The 
incentive, worth NRs. 300, is provided to 
the health team for each delivery they 
assist in a public health institution or at the 
woman’s home. 
Home and facility-based supervised deliveries Powell-
Jackson et 
al. 2008; 
Ensor et al. 
2009 
Janani 
Soraksha 
Yonjana 
2005 
onwards 
National (though UNFPA study looks 
at 5 states: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh) 
Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) - provider 
payments for institutional births; 
payments made to community health 
workers. Incentive payments for women 
(CCT) and ASHAs (community health 
workers); additional payments for 
administrative costs and IEC. 
 
MNCH: At least 3 ANC visits, institutional 
deliveries, immunization of newborns, 
postnatal checkup, and counselling to 
encourage breastfeeding - however in 
practical terms, the trigger is institutional 
delivery (institutional births are defined as 
births at government facilities and private 
facilities accredited under the programme) 
Lim et al 
2010; 
UNFPA 2009 
(assessment 
of JSY in 5 
States) 
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Table 2B Description of P4P schemes (continued) 
Programme Who received P4P payments?  Payment methods Other accompanying 
components 
Summary of evaluation/study design Authors 
Quality of evidence 
PAYMENTS TO GOVERNMENTS 
Global Fund 
to fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
(GFATM) 
The evaluation found that while the 
GFATM is expected to enter into 
partnerships with implementing agencies, 
there were few contractually binding 
partnerships. Instead the GFATM relied 
on a "friendship model" with affirmations 
from committed partners. Implementing 
agencies could include private or public 
sector or NGOs. 
Disbursements are made periodically, 
conditional on performance results.  
Other global programmes 
such as the U.S. President’s  
plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
and other partners, including 
the World Bank’s Multi-
Country HIV/AIDS programme 
(MAP) and the U.S. President’s 
Malaria Initiative have also 
helped to focus efforts on the 
three diseases 
Three separate evaluations performed using a mix 
of methods and focusing on 18 countries, including 
primary data collection through district 
comprehensive assessments; review of secondary 
data such as Demographic and Health Survey 
results and country health information system 
data; quantitative analyses to assess grant 
performance; review of Global Fund 
documentation and a broader base of literature; 
and qualitative analyses of focused interviews with 
Global Fund Board Members, Secretariat Staff, 
implementers and partners at the global and 
country levels.  The evaluation was conducted on a 
very short timeline. Evaluation relates to GFATM as 
a whole - not just the PBF element. 
Macro 
International 
2009 
Global 
Alliance on 
Vaccine 
Initiative 
(GAVI) -HSS 
window 
National governments Disbursements are made periodically, 
conditional on performance results.  
Three other windows for 
funding for immunizations 
and vaccines and CSO support 
also exist to which countries 
can apply for funding. In 
addition, there are other 
larger donors (especially the 
World Bank) that are 
supporting HSS. In 
comparison, GAVI HSS support 
is smaller.  
Evaluation is based on 21 country case studies. 
Since HSS was only introduced recently, the 
window of time was not sufficient enough to 
capture impact. While mention is made of 
maternal care, specifics are lacking. Moreover, the 
evaluation states that current it would be difficult 
to separate out the impact of GAVI HSS in the 
outcomes indicators  
HLSP 2009;  
www.gavi 
alliance.org 
PAYMENTS TO MID LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs, local government) 
Family Health 
programme, 
Brazil 
Municipalities receive funding from 
federal government through the 
provincial governments. This is a public 
health sector programme 
Healthcare expenditure is federally 
mandated, with contributions from 
the regional and national coffers 
No information given Summary of scheme; editorial  Hecht et al. 
2004; Harris 
2010 
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Summary of evaluation/study design Authors 
Quality of evidence 
Plan Nacer in 
Argentina 
Facilities (both public and private). Staff 
can use up to 50% of payments for staff. 
At the Government level:  The World 
Bank provides lending for Plan Nacer. 
Future lending from World Bank for 
the programme is contingent upon 
meeting certain milestones during 
lending period. At the local level: 
Upon verification of results, transfers 
made from National Ministry of 
Health to Provincial Health Insurance 
Unit which pays the providers  
Plan Nacer has a health 
insurance component to 
encourage demand side 
uptake of services.  
These are descriptive reports, not impact 
evaluations  
Niamoli & 
Vergeer 
2010; Eichler 
& Glassman 
2008 
Innovations 
in Family 
Planning 
Services, 
Uttar 
Pradesh India 
SIFPSA receives payments from USAID. 
SIFPSA then pays its contractors. 
Payments to SIFPSA are made when 
agreed upon benchmarks are 
achieved. Benchmarks are all costed 
and funds are released only after the 
benchmark is achieved. The majority 
of the measures are process-oriented.  
Since 2005, JSY has been 
operating nationally, which 
has a strong CCT (demand 
side) component. It also has a 
supply side component with 
payments to health workers 
through facilities.  
This is not an evaluation – just a short description 
of the programme. 
USAID 2010 
Output-
based 
payments in 
Haiti 
Payments made from USAID to NGOs via 
MSH (Management Sciences for Health - a 
US based international NGO). Some part 
of bonus could be passed on to staff 
This evolved over time with the 
setting of targets. 1999-2001: 95% of 
a negotiated budget was paid in fixed 
quarterly sums and an additional 10% 
was conditional on results (NGOs 
could be paid up to 105%); 2002-04: 
fixed quarterly payments up to 95% 
of a negotiated budget, with 5% of 
the award fee (referred to as the 
“withhold”) based on achieving 
performance on management 
indicators and the other 5% of the 
award fee (referred to as a “bonus”) 
linked service indicators. In 2005, this 
changed again: NGOs can earn up to 
106% if all targets are met. PBF 
associated with all aspects including 
signing contract and submission of 
reports. 
Not discussed, but technical 
assistance, increased 
autonomy, flexibility and 
reduced reporting are clearly 
all important changes which 
accompanied the scheme. 
Project conducted baseline survey through 
contracting an independent firm for the catchment 
area for the 3 NGOs initially contracted in 1999 
using cluster sampling. Data were collected on 
immunization, ORS, ANC visits, discontinuation 
rates of oral and injectable contraceptives. 
Additionally, data on waiting times was gathered 
by measuring waiting times in a sample of 
institutions at different intervals. NGOs were not 
selected randomly, but rather those were inducted 
into the program that were perceived to be 
capable of meeting the requirements of the 
project. The study measures trend against baseline. 
There was no control group against which the 
performance was measured. Panel regressions 
aimed to isolate both NGO specific effects and 
contract period effects that may contribute to 
improved results. However, the lack of control 
group, the ancillary components and the switch 
from a 100% reimbursement to a 95% fixed costs 
model all make attribution of effects to PBF hard. 
The study is a CGD working paper.  
Eichler et al. 
2007 
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Contracting 
of Health 
Services Pilot 
Project, 
Cambodia 
Government paid the contractors. 
Contractors were responsible for district 
and lower level payments. In the two 
contracting-out districts health workers 
were paid higher fixed salaries than 
previously paid with incentive of dismissal 
(negative incentive) for poor 
performance.  In contracting-in districts 
the incentive consisted of a fixed 
supplement to staff members’ 
government salaries plus a performance-
based bonus. In the Pereang district of 
Prey Veng province performance 
contracts were set up with health 
facilities and their management, who in 
turn set up contracts with staff. Here, it is 
reported that staff members received a 
guaranteed supplement of 55% of their 
government salaries plus a 30% 
performance bonus and a 15% 
punctuality bonus.    
Contracting-out districts received 
their funds directly from the ADB 
after the Ministry of Health made a 
payment request. The contracting-in 
districts received the management 
fee portion of their contract budget in 
the same manner. Operating funds 
and supplies were provided to the 
contracting-in and comparison 
districts through normal government 
channels. 
No information given Randomised trial. Measured against baseline and 
control. Baseline in 1997 with full follow up in 2003 
consisting of survey on perceptions of the quality 
of care at government facilities; survey of the 143 
health centres in the project area (no baseline); 
and administrative data on public expenditures 
during the project years compiled from Ministry of 
Health records (in 2004).  Sample size was 3700 
households consisting of 20,000 individuals.   
Bloom et al. 
2007 
Performance-
based 
contracting 
in the DRC 
At the national level NGOs receive money 
through an IDA financed project. Then 
NGOs pay health zones. 15% of the 
budget is reserved for health worker 
incentive payments 
No information given No information given Not an impact evaluation - World Bank OBA brief Johannes et 
al. 2008 
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Paying NGOs 
for 
performance 
in 
Afghanistan 
World Bank pays the MoPH through the 
MoF. The MoPH pay the NGOs. One 
contract per province.  USAID and EC pay 
NGOs directly. 
For World Bank project, bonuses are 
provided in stages, with 1 percent of 
the contract value payable for at least 
a 10 percent increase from the 
baseline for specified indicators. The 
final 5 percent bonus is paid at the 
end of the contract. Overall bonus is 
limited to 1o% of contract value. 
Relative flexibility in how the budget 
is spent as long as National Salary 
Policy and specifications of the basic 
package of health services (what 
services, staffing patterns, and ratios 
of facility to population) are met. 
None mentioned but 
considerable overall 
investment in rebuilding the 
health sector and beyond 
post-conflict 
This is a case study assessment of the services 
provided in Afghanistan. It is a descriptive study 
and not an impact evaluation.                                                                                              
Sondorp et 
al. 2009 
Pay for 
performance 
in South 
Sudan 
Lead agencies/INGOS implementing the 
contracts 
Lead agencies are paid every 6 
months, with 70% being paid upon 
submission of the report, and 30% 
upon verification of results by the 
MOH. If targets are not met, the MOH 
has thirty days to negotiate with lead 
agencies on how to overcome the 
obstacles. However, there is no 
clause in the contracts that says that 
payment will not be made.  
No information given This is a feature story - no evaluation as yet Morgan 
2011 
Performance 
based 
contracting 
in Liberia 
Accredited NGOs  No information given Incentives are also provided 
for other services including 
child health. The Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare is 
also implementing a similar 
programme of direct 
contracting with counties and 
NGOs.  
 
 
 
 
 
Briefs describing process of development, not 
impact 
Brennan et 
al. 2010; 
Morgan 
2011 
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PAYMENTS TO FACILITIES 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Rwanda 
Facilities at district level providing basic 
care, including health centres and district 
hospitals; both public and private (faith-
based) with a 60-40 split. Funds could be 
used at their own discretion. Most was 
provided to staff as incentives (roughly 
the funding ratio was 2:1 for incentives to 
staff versus running costs). 
Quarterly remuneration against a 
given set of indicators for each health 
centre and for each district hospital 
for services delivered. Additional 
remunerations against "several 
mechanisms assuring the quality of 
the service delivered". Financial 
incentives linked to service type, 
ranging from US$ 4.59 for 
institutional delivery to US$0.09 for 
1st ANC visit.  
Overall Rwandan context: 
fiscal decentralization of 
health sector and 
development of health 
insurance 'mutuelles', both 
contributed to improvements 
in MNCH outcome. In addition 
to PBF funding, funding for 
AIDS from PEPFAR contributed 
to Rwanda's 4-fold increase in 
the health budget. Increase in 
workers' salaries; and wide-
spread distribution of bed 
nets also contributed to the 
improvements in health 
outcomes.  
Study design: treatment/control comparison: 80 
facilities which were being incorporated into the 
programme taken as the treatment group and 86 
as control group (total 166 facilities studied). 
Control group would continue to receive input-
based financing for the next 23 months until 
national roll out of P4P was completed. Two 
surveys conducted (one at baseline, and one after 
25 months). Data collected through facility 
questionnaires. Additionally household survey on 
2158 households with children under age 5 also 
conducted (13 HH selected randomly from each 
catchment area). Maternal baseline characteristics 
taken from facility survey and child baseline from 
HH surveys.  Possible limitations include: recall 
bias/error by interviewees; original randomised 
design compromised by prior implementation in 
some districts; not clear if the incentive effect of 
prenatal care extend to other services; does not 
show impact on health outcomes; no comparison 
of what the effect would have been if payments 
were made to individual practitioners instead of 
facilities (Basinga et al 2011).  
Basinga et al 
2011; 
Basinga et 
al. 2010; 
Sekabaraga 
et al  2011; 
Kalk et al 
2010 
Performance-
based 
financing in 
DRC 
39 health centres and 4 hospitals through 
contracting with a purchasing authority. 
In addition, health centre managers 
further signed 22 subcontracts with 
private clinics in their catchment areas for 
better coverage. Staff benefited indirectly 
through increase in facility revenues. 
In 2006 an autonomous financing 
authority/purchasing authority was 
established under the PBF 
programme. All payments are made 
through this authority which signed 
contracts with district health centres 
and hospitals. Monthly subsidies are 
paid to participating facilities and 
could vary between $200 and $4,000 
based on performance against 
indicators, with up to a 15% bonus for 
a score of 100%. Health facilities in 
remote areas received an additional 
15% bonus due to their isolation.  
Investment in districts 
differed according to the NGO 
which was supporting them. 
Fee regimes also differed 
across the participating 
districts/controls, and there 
were other significant 
contextual differences. 
Participating facilities received 
a range of technical support, 
including in developing 
business plans. 
Baseline was developed through a stratified 
household cluster survey conducted in November 
2005 (n= 240 households) in the two districts 
participating in the performance-based financing 
experiment and in two control districts (n= 200 
households) prior to intervention. Post 
intervention assessment was conducted in 2008 to 
measure the same quantitative health service 
outputs and 6 indicators of patients’ perceptions of 
quality. The post intervention assessment also 
included an evaluation of 53 indicators of health 
centre quality using logistic regression. To note is 
that the sample size is small, and is further 
compromised by cluster sampling. 
Soeters et 
al. 2011 
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Pay for 
Performance 
in Burundi 
Payments received by health facilities 
based on performance against 
quantitative indicators: health centres 
receive US$700−1,500 per month, and 
district hospitals receive US$3,500−5,000 
per month. Facilities management have 
autonomy in allocating payments to two 
categories: staff or service quality 
improvements. However, staff financial 
incentives payments cannot be more than 
50% of each payment. 
Pilot: Agence d’Achat de Performance 
(AAPs), autonomous NGO established 
bodies, with funding directly from the 
Ministry of Finance, are responsible 
for contracting health facilities. Under 
the HealthNet TPO model contracting 
was done between AAP, health 
facility and the Provincial Steering 
Committees, multisectoral bodies 
with representation from health 
facilities and sometimes led by staff 
from the provincial administration. In 
the CORDAID areas, contracts 
between health facilities and AAPs 
were negotiated and signed directly.                                                                                                   
Scale up: Provincial committees for 
verification and validation (CPVV) 
replace AAPs in the scale up. These 
are public-private entities, 
responsible for contract negotiation 
and signature, and data verification 
and validation. These will be 
complemented by the Provincial 
Health Management Teams (akin to 
the Provincial Steering Committee).  
A national P4P technical unit 
known as the Cellule 
Technique Nationale has been 
established to define the 
broader P4P strategy and to 
coordinate the programme. It 
is composed of the different 
stakeholders.  
This is a case study providing an assessment of the 
P4P programme overall. It is a descriptive study 
and does not provide an impact evaluation. It 
reports on an unpublished evaluation of the pilot. 
Busogoro & 
Beith 2010; 
Toonen et 
al. 2009 
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CORDAID Pay 
for 
Performance 
pilot project 
in Tanzania 
Health facilities managed by the Dioceses 
via the Diocesan Health Offices (DHOs). 
Cordaid sets guidelines for use of 
bonuses: 50% maximum for staff 
motivation; equipment, drugs and 
supplies to a maximum of 30%; 
infrastructure max 20%; running cost 
(including maintenance and 
communication) to a maximum of 
10%.The District Health Offices are 
eligible for 25% of the performance bonus 
allocation 
Progress against pre-set targets is 
measured on a 6 monthly basis. 
Payment is made upon verification of 
results. Payments are made to the 
DHOs which then pay the health 
facilities. The annual allocation to 
health facilities is set at 50% as 
guaranteed base fund; and 50% 
earmarked as bonus allocation.  
CORDAID has worked with the 
dioceses for decades. 
This is a mainly qualitative study, conducted over a 
3 week period, with data collected mainly through 
interviews with stakeholders at central and district 
levels and visits to sites (P4P mission-based DHOs 
and non P4P government facilities). Cordaid 
supports 5 dioceses of which 3 were selected for 
the study. Criteria for selection were: (i) remote 
populations with limited resources, and (ii) 
dioceses that were accessible (by air).  A total of 18 
health facilities were visited. Information was 
gathered through (i) health staff and management 
interviews; (ii) study of HMIS to extrapolate data 
(2005-2007); (iii) client satisfaction interviews with 
randomly selected health facility users (at these 
facilities);  (iv) staff motivation questionnaire 
followed by focus group discussions; and (v) 
interviews with district and diocesan 
representatives, and community representatives 
where available. Limitations are presented in the 
paper. Main issues with quality of HMIS and 
financial data and there is no rigorous evaluation of 
the data. Additionally, only a few interviews could 
be conducted with community representatives 
(patient/user side perspective is limited). This is a 
report prepared by Cordaid on their programme in 
Tanzania and covers the period 2005-07 
Canavan & 
Swai 2008 
Performance-
based 
contracting 
in Uganda, 
2003-6 
PNFPs  No information given None mentioned. However, in 
the health sector, other 
changes were taking place, 
including an increase in the 
salaries in the public sector; 
which led to a shift in the 
movement of health workers 
from PNFPs to public sector.   
Quasi-experimental design of study.  2.5 year study 
with 3 rounds of surveys. Two treatment groups 
compared with one control group. Control group 
consisted of public, private, and PNFP facilities and 
was subject to pre-existing financial arrangements. 
Treatment group B received base grant with 
autonomy on spending. Treatment group C 
received base grant with autonomy to spend as 
well as bonuses if self selected output targets were 
achieved. World Bank - RBF Feature Story 
Morgan 
2010 
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Performance-
based 
Contracting 
Pilot, 
Nicaragua 
Hospitals sign yearly contracts with the 
Ministry of Health (MINSA). MINSA pays 
the hospitals and it is up to the hospitals 
how to disburse the bonus (which could 
be as a employee bonus via salaries; or 
apply it towards improvements to the 
hospital).  
Hospitals are scored on performance, 
and bonus provided on a schedule 
where services and management 
each can earn up to 20% of the total 
bonus, while quality and organization 
each can earn up to 30% of the total 
bonus.  
None mentioned.  Policy evaluation. There is no impact evaluation on 
services.  Focus is more on the political economy 
Jack 2003 
Pay for 
Performance, 
Egypt 
Service providers (public and private) that 
are accredited and linked to the Family 
Health programme.  
The Family Health Fund (autonomous 
body) contracts and pays public, 
private and NGO health service 
providers. When it is verified that a 
health care facility meets targets, FHF 
makes a cash payment to the facility 
manager, who then distributes the 
incentives to the staff involved in 
attaining the target. Audits are done 
on a quarterly basis and it takes up to 
2 months after the end of quarter to 
receive the bonus payment 
There is a strong CCT 
programme as well as health 
insurance programmes which 
cover different pockets of 
population (public employees, 
school aged children, etc) 
This is a descriptive case study focusing on the 
design of the P4P scheme. It does not evaluate the 
utilization effect or health outcomes due to P4P. 
However, given the accompanying components, it 
would be difficult to tease out the effects of supply 
side incentives only.  
El-Saharty et 
al. 2010 
Pay for 
Performance 
Pilot in 
Zambia 
Payments made to facilities but Cordaid 
specified that 40-60% of payments could 
go to staff.  Rest for infrastructure, drugs, 
supplies, and running costs (with 
guidelines for allocation to different 
categories). Maximum of 20% on top to 
district health office for management 
Base payments of Zambian Kwacha 
(ZMK) 90,000,000 as fixed funding at 
the start of the year, with a similar 
amount available to each hospital if 
100% of the targets were achieved. 
For health centres the amount was 
ZMK 50,000,000 each. Bonus paid 
every 6 months. 
Independent of this project, in 
kind demand-side incentives 
offered in some places such as 
mother kits. 15,000 Euros 
given to HCs and 30,000 Euros 
to hospitals to allow them to 
rehabilitate or buy supplies at 
start of project. Authors note 
need for more technical 
support and capacity building 
in implementing project. 
Cordaid review of its programme. Based on 
interviews and the collection and analysis of health 
and financial data. Semi-structured interviews with 
government officials at national, provincial and 
district level and donors such as the World Bank 
and CHAZ. The set up and effects of PBF were 
studied in four PBF supported mission hospitals (St. 
Paul’s, Kasaba, Lubwe and Minga) and one Rural 
Health Centre (Muzeyi) Discussions, interviews and 
data collected in Mbereshi and Petauke hospital as 
well as Chiparamba Rural Health Centre, were used 
for comparison with the PBF supported facilities. - 
This study explored health data from 2004-2007. 
The evaluators have not been able to compare this 
to conditions prior to PBF implementation and it 
can thus not be determined whether changes are 
due to PBF or have always been the case. Too early 
for an impact evaluation.  
Vergeer & 
Collins 2008 
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Performance-
based Grants 
for 
Reproductive 
Health in the 
Philippines 
(PBG1) 
PBG 1 directed at local health facilities 
(PBG 2 discussed below ) 
No information given Another variant is PBG 2 (see 
below) 
WHO policy brief based on a rapid assessment. WHO 2011 
PAYMENTS TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Tanzania 
Health facilities receive bonuses which 
are supposed to be divided among health 
team members equally, with each worker 
having the ability to earn up to of 200,000 
Tanzanian shillings (Tsh) annually. At the 
hospital level payments are made to 
directly to the hospital with autonomy to 
allocate as long as staff is consulted.  
Bonuses are channeled from the 
government through the Council 
Medical Officer of Health Accounts to 
facility bank accounts opened at the 
dispensary and health centre level. 
Council Health Management Team 
(CHMT) bonuses are linked to the 
facilities they manage. CHMTs report 
to Regional Health Management 
Team (RHMT). In order to qualify for 
a bonus, CHMTs and RHMTs must 
complete their HMIS reporting in a 
timely manner. CHMTs qualify for 
50% of their bonus when 50% or 
more of their health facilities reach 
their targets. Another 50% of the 
payment comes from timely reporting 
to the RHMTs. RHMTs are paid 50% of 
their payment for their timely 
reporting in HMIS and 50% payment 
for performance for 50% or more of 
health facilities in the region meeting 
their targets. Payment is annual. 
None mentioned This is a case study based on an assessment of 
existing documentation and interviews. A number 
of problems with design and implementation are 
noted. For example, the verification of 
performance was carried out by district and 
regional supervisors, whose own bonuses 
depended on the performance of the facilities, 
causing a conflict of interest. Communication of the 
policy to district teams was also poor 
Morgan and 
Eichler 2009 
Performance-
based Grants 
for 
Reproductive 
Health in the 
Philippines 
(PBG2) 
PBG 2 aimed at TBAs, CHWs, and 
midwives (the women's health teams). 
PBG 1 (discussed above) 
PBG 2 payments vary: Under one 
method (e.g. Sorsogon Province) Peso 
1000 (US$ 22) received by local 
women's health team for every 
facility based birth. Division of 
payment among the TBA (60%), 
midwife (20%) and CHW (20%); under 
As mentioned PBG 2 has a 
demand side incentive for the 
pregnant women worth Peso 
500. Another variant is PBG 1 
directed at facilities 
WHO policy brief based on a rapid assessment. WHO 2011 
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another method (Surigao del Sur), the 
Peso 1000 is divided in a 60:40 ratio 
among the women health team and 
the health facility team: delivering 
doctor (10%), attending nurse (10%), 
health facility (20%). Each member of 
the Women Health team receives 
20% of the Peso 600.  
Cambodia 
Midwifery 
Allowance 
Payment to midwives by the government: 
US$ 15 per live birth in a health center or 
health post; US$ 10 per delivery in a 
regional or national hospital. Payments 
also provided to Village Health Support 
Groups and TBAs for referring women to 
facilities 
  Health equity funds and 
community based health 
insurance on the demand side 
to encourage utilization of 
services, especially among the 
poor 
Case study data; not an impact evaluation Hawkins 
2011; 
Murakami 
2009 
Battagram 
P4P project, 
Pakistan, 
Save the 
Children 
Health workers employed by the 
government in public health facilities 
were provided bonuses by Save the 
Children. Districts staff and staff working 
on vertical programmes also received 
bonuses, although these were fixed (35% 
of salary). 
Payments were made directly to the 
health workers' bank accounts by 
Save the Children 
Save the Children was 
managing the health facilities 
at the district level, of which 
PBI was a small part. The 
district health budget from 
the provincial government 
was also channelled through 
the NGO, which had the 
mandate to (i) organise and 
manage the healthcare 
services; (ii) procure and 
supply medicines; (iii) 
implement HMIS; and (iv) 
monitor and supervise the 
health system. 
Mix of qualitative and quantitative methods 
employed.  The district was divided into 4 hubs 
under the project. For this analysis, health facilities 
were chosen from each hub, with an additional 
stratification against performance: very good, 
good, satisfactory and poor - one under each 
category from each hub. Quantitative analysis was 
conducted using HMIS data, financial records, 
monthly progress reports, supervisory and 
performance scores of facilities, and project 
documents from 2007 to mid-2010. Qualitative 
data was collected though 11 key informant 
interviews with stakeholders (Save the Children, 
World Bank, provincial and district offices, and one 
local association). At the facility level, in-depth 
interviews were held with 7 managers and other 
staff working at 4 facilities (three basic health units 
and one rural health centre). In addition, 11 focus 
group discussions were held with staff (male and 
female) and community members (male and 
female). 
Witter et al. 
2011 
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Safe Delivery 
Incentive 
Program, 
Nepal  
Health workers who could be medical 
doctor, staff nurse, auxiliary nurse 
midwife, health assistant, auxiliary health 
worker or maternal and child health 
worker. The deliveries have to be either 
at a public facility or at the woman's 
home 
Funds are provided to health 
institutions through the District Public 
Health Office. 
Strong CCT component aimed 
at women and health facilities 
were reimbursed the cost of 
the facility-based delivery. 
48% of the budget for the 
SDIP went to mothers; 47% to 
service providers and 5% to 
health institutions 
themselves.  
Evaluation was conducted using data from 10 
districts. Two types of evaluations were conduced: 
process and impact, both of which employed a mix 
of quantitative and qualitative analysis. Data was 
collected through surveys of health institutions and 
women (50 health institutions were surveyed); 
HMIS, SDIP and Emergency Obstetrics Care 
monitoring systems and the Mother and Infant 
Research Activities (MIRA) community surveillance 
system. Data analysis was conducted using 
regression analysis, interrupted time series and 
propensity score matching. In addition, in-depth 
interviews and focus group discussions were also 
conducted at the community level. The evaluation 
of the programme was conducted for the 
Government of Nepal.  Most of the results relate to 
the demand-side payments and so are not 
reported here. The programme was amalgamated 
into the Aama programme (including nation-wide 
fee exemption) from 2009 onward. 
Powell-
Jackson et 
al. 2008; 
Ensor et al. 
2009 
Janani 
Soraksha 
Yonjana 
At the district level payments made to 
ASHA or community health workers with 
accreditation with the trigger being 
facility based delivery. Payment is Rs. 600 
for rural areas and Rs. 200 for urban areas 
per institutional delivery.  
This is a Central Government-
supported scheme. Payment is made 
from government to service providers 
through State Governments.                                                                                                   
State/District level: State prepares 
state and district budget based on 
costs for JSY which is funded by the 
national government. The Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare provides 
funds to the State Health Society 
which is responsible for its 
disbursement to the districts.                      
CHW Payments: ASHA are paid 
directly by either the Medical Officers 
at PHCs after they bring women to 
facility for delivery or directly by the 
ANMs.  
JSY is mainly a CCT scheme 
with a PBF component. CCTS 
are provided to women for 
institutional deliveries, ANC
and PNC visits.  
Uses two rounds of DLHS (2002-04 and 2007-09) - 
nationwide district level data; methods used 
include exact matching, with vs without analysis 
and D in D with logistic regression with state and 
district fixed effects. Peer reviewed journal article 
(Lim et al. 2010).                                                                                                                               
 
Assessment is based on mixed methods; 
quantitative data collected from 1200 mothers 
(delivered in the past 1 year) from rural areas; 
questionnaire for community leaders, checklist 
questionnaires for CHW, ASHAs, ANMs, medical 
officers of PHCs, CHCs,and government hospitals 
(n=50); in depth interviews with district hospitals, 
state and district nodal officers. (UNFPA India) 
Lim et al 
2010; 
UNFPA 2009 
(assessment 
of JSY in 5 
States) 
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Organization of care/range of 
services 
PAYMENTS TO GOVERNMENTS 
Global Fund 
to fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
Significant increase in the number of sites 
delivering HIV interventions since 2004: in most 
countries sites providing testing and counselling 
has doubled between 2004 and 2007; PMTCT is 
now offered in at least 1/4th of health facilities in 
all countries, even though the number of sites is 
below one per 1,000 pregnant women in all 
countries, except Zambia (2.2 per 1,000). 
Sacrifice of quality to achieve 
target outputs reported in some 
countries 
Estimated that in the 14 countries 
with a generalized epidemic over 
570,000 life years were added from 
the use of ART between 2003 and 
2007. In the same period, it was 
estimated that the number of 
infections averted due to PMTCT 
amounted to over 16,000. 
Not analysed, though the 
additional funds have 
expanded the range of 
services available in many 
countries 
Macro 
International 
2009 
PAYMENTS TO MID LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS 
Plan Nacer in 
Argentina 
No information given Although not mentioned, 
generally indicators have shown 
improvement 
No information given No information given Niamoli & 
Vergeer 
2010; Eichler 
& Glassman 
2008 
Output based 
Payments in 
Haiti 
Panel regressions show that (a) immunization 
coverage increased between 13 and 24 
percentage points; (b) births by SBA increased 
from 17 to 27 percentage points. Changes in 
utilization of ANC and post-natal care were not 
significant.  
Not measured empirically - 
anecdotal evidence from NGOs 
that emphasis was skewed 
towards meeting targets versus 
quality 
No information given Within the NGOs, there is 
evidence of capacity being 
built, but no discussion of 
wider impact on organisation 
of services/health system 
Eichler et al. 
2007 
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Contracting 
of Health 
Services Pilot 
Project, 
Cambodia 
Contracting in caused a 36 percentage point 
increase in ANC visits (statistically significant); 
contracting out caused a significant increase in 
vitamin A receipt in children (42 percentage 
points); contracting in and out both lead to 
significant increase in use of public health services 
for curative care consultation (18 and 29 
percentage points), and in facility based deliveries 
(18  and 30 percentage points).  Immunizations 
also increased substantially but were only 
significant under contracting in. Care seeking 
behavior: Household members were about 3.6 
and 5.4 percentage points more likely to consult a 
public provider under contracting-in and 
contracting-out, respectively, compared to a 
comparison group baseline of 0.6%. This effect is 
statistically significant.  
Significant impact on probability 
of scheduled staff being present. 
This increased by 50 percentage 
points for contracting in and 79 
percentage points for contracting 
out. Significant increase in 
supervision visits from 2.5 to 5.7 
over past 3 months. This was not 
significant for contracting in. 
Overall, greater improvement in 
management of services under 
contracting out compared to 
contracting in.  Perceived quality 
of care by users was negative for 
both variants, but not statistically 
significant.  
Contracting out reduced the chance of 
an individual reporting they were sick 
in the past month (significant at 5% 
under randomization inference)and 
reduced the incidence of diarrhea in 
children under 5 (significant at 10% 
under randomization inference). 
With contracting-in, more 
likely to have round the clock 
services available at health 
centres (increase of 83 
percentage points is 
statistically significant). The 
contracting-out effect is 47 
percentage points but not 
significant. No significant 
impact on providing delivery 
services due to contracting in 
or out  
Bloom  et al. 
2007 
Performance-
based 
contracting 
in the DRC 
In the covered areas, outpatient consultations 
have increased from 0.06 per capital at baseline 
to 0.30 in 2007. Measles immunization coverage 
increased from 25% to 92%; assisted deliveries 
from 25 % to 74 %.   
No information given No information given No information given Johannes et 
al. 2008 
Paying NGOs 
for 
performance 
in 
Afghanistan 
Overall coverage of services increased during 
2003-06 in all 34 provinces. Proportion of facility 
to population improved from 1 to 34,000 to 1 to 
20,000 during this period. Increase in 
immunizations (DPT3); facility based deliveries 
have doubled; 300% increase in female health 
workers in 8 provinces; ANC visits increased from 
45 to 75% in the 3 MoPH provinces 
No information given No information given No information given Sondorp et 
al. 2009 
Performance 
based 
contracting 
in Liberia 
Some utilization results presented: 81% increase 
in facility-based deliveries; 52% increase in 
couple-years of family planning protection; 134 % 
increase in pregnant women receiving a second 
dose of intermittent preventive treatment of 
malaria (IPT2) 
No information given No information given No information given Morgan 
2011 
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PAYMENTS TO FACILITIES 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Rwanda 
Compared to control group: a 23% increase in the 
number of institutional deliveries; 56% increase in 
no. of preventative visits for children under 24 
months; 132% increase in no. of visits for children 
24 to 59 months; no impact on women 
completing 4 ANC visits or child immunization 
(Basinga et al. 2011)                                                                                              
An increase of 0.157 SD (95%CI: 
0.026-0.289) in prenatal quality 
as measured by compliance with 
Rwandan prenatal care clinical 
practice guidelines.  
Not measured in this study. No information given Basinga et al 
2011; 
Basinga et 
al. 2010; 
Sekabaraga 
et al  2011; 
Kalk et al 
2010 
Performance-
based 
Financing in 
the 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo (DRC) 
Significant improvement compared to control 
group for knowledge of HIV/AIDS and use of 
modern health facilities or pharmacy (difference 
of 10 percentage points each, significant at 5% 
and 10 % respectively). Other indicators, including 
use of family planning, showed improvement, but 
not significant compared to control group 
Perceived quality of care saw 
improvement compared to 
control group: availability of 
drugs (difference of 37 
percentage points between 
treatment and control group), 
quality (15 percentage points 
difference), respect for patients 
(12 percentage points 
difference); the professionally 
determined performance 
indicators for the health centre 
was also significantly better for 
treatment vs. control group (65% 
vs. 39%) as was the indicator for 
qualified personnel (65% vs. 
54%).  
No information given No information given Soeters et 
al. 2011 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Burundi 
Evaluation results of pilot show increase in uptake 
of services, higher child immunizations and facility 
based deliveries by 50 to 60% compared to 
baseline.  
Quality of services improved No information given Providers develop their own 
business plans as well as 
contract with individual 
health workers, and other 
input providers, which has 
lead to greater clarity on 
expectations and roles.  
Busogoro & 
Beith 2010; 
Toonen et 
al. 2009 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Tanzania 
No difference observed in P4P and non P4P 
utilization rates. 
Inconclusive No information given No impact on range of 
services recorded.  
Canavan & 
Swai 2008 
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Performance 
based 
contracting 
in Uganda 
No gain for PBF group compared to control 
groups. 22 of 23 facilities met at least one of 3 
chosen targets. Group B (greater autonomy) 
performed better. 
Based on exit polls, data show 
deterioration of quality of 
services (attitude of staff) among 
the bonus group.  
No information given Based on exit polls, 
availability of medicines 
worsened in the bonus group 
Morgan 
2010 
Pay for 
Performance 
Pilot in 
Zambia 
Limited improvements in access to curative care, 
in both the PBF and non-PBF facilities 
No information given No information given No information given Collins & 
Vergeer 
2008 
Performance-
based Grants 
for 
Reproductive 
Health in the 
Philippines 
(PBG1) 
General improvement reported in facility based 
births. For example, in Infugao, facility based 
births increased from 31% to 50% between 2007 
and 2008.  
No information given No information given No information given WHO 2011 
PAYMENTS TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS 
Performance-
based Grants 
for 
Reproductive 
Health in the 
Philippines 
(PBG2) 
General improvement in facility based births 
reported. However, specific effects of PBG 2on 
utilization not presented.  
No information given No information given No information given WHO 2011 
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Name of 
programme 
EVIDENCE OF IMPACT ON: Authors 
Patient payments Equity Provider motivation 
Unintended consequences/ comments 
on results 
PAYMENTS TO GOVERNMENTS 
Global Fund 
to fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
No information given No evidence of changes in coverage 
differences between disadvantaged 
groups and those who are better off. 
All countries would benefit from 
expanding services to make services 
more accessible to people in 
underserved areas. Although gender 
equity is a guiding principle, only 44-
55% of countries had indicators to 
measure this. The Monitoring & 
Evaluation Toolkit does not yet include 
gender-specific indicators and inclusion 
would benefit measurement.  
 
No information given Not discussed here, though a number of 
studies have examined the impact of 
the GFATM on health systems, with 
mixed results. 
Macro 
International 
2009 
PAYMENTS TO MID LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS 
Plan Nacer in 
Argentina 
No information given Not analysed, but the focus of the 
scheme is on enrollment of poor 
women and children 
No information given No information given Niamoli & 
Vergeer 
2010; Eichler 
& Glassman 
2008 
Output based 
Payments in 
Haiti 
No information given No information given Overall satisfaction - system is better than 
previous reimbursement-based one in terms 
of workload for NGOs. Anecdotal evidence 
presented in the paper (feedback from 
NGOS) suggests too much "stress" over 
meeting institutional targets, mainly from 
having to make organizational changes and 
for individuals in the organization having to 
change the way they work. Loss of income if 
a target is not met, is also frustrating for the 
NGOs, especially when targets may not be 
met due to other actors (e.g. not receiving 
supplies in time from another vendor).  
No information given Eichler et al. 
2007 
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Name of 
programme 
EVIDENCE OF IMPACT ON: Authors 
Patient payments Equity Provider motivation 
Unintended consequences/ comments 
on results 
 
Contracting 
of Health 
Services Pilot 
Project, 
Cambodia 
No significant impact recorded No information given No information given Contracting in had a 21 percentage 
point improvement in knowledge of 
AIDS risk factors (statistically 
significant). In aggregate, the effects 
were not statistically significant for non-
targeted indicators. These include 
treatment of diarrhea in children, the 
number of antenatal services (excluding 
a blood pressure check, which was 
targeted), whether individuals report 
that an outreach team has visited the 
village in the previous four weeks, 
whether a mother breastfeed a 
newborn within six hours of birth, 
whether a mother gave a newborn 
water in the first month of life, and 
knowledge of AIDS risk factors. 
 
Bloom et al. 
2007 
Performance-
based 
contracting 
in the DRC 
The reported average 
consultation fee in project areas 
has declined from US$4 to US$2. 
 
 
 
No information given No information given No information given Johannes et 
al. 2008 
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Name of 
programme 
EVIDENCE OF IMPACT ON: Authors 
Patient payments Equity Provider motivation 
Unintended consequences/ comments 
on results 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Rwanda 
Patients covered simultaneously 
under health insurance 
(mutuelles), which helped lower 
their costs: Slight decrease in 
direct health spending in real 
terms during 2000-05: Adjusted 
median spending per episode 
declined from RwF 555 to RwF 
419. The decline happened for 
all socio-economic groups. For 
the poorest, median 
expenditures per episode 
dropped from RwF 348 to RwF 
281. Payments decreased for all 
categories except transport. 
Payment at the point of delivery 
decreased by 35% for 
consultations, and by 30% for 
drugs.  
General change over period (not PBF-
specific): utilization of services 
increased from 10.7% to 17.4% among 
the poorest quintile. Assisted birth 
deliveries increased from 12.1% to 
42.7% , the largest increase for assisted 
deliveries. Under 5 utilization of 
modern health services doubled from 
7% to 18 %. Distance to facility was 
seen as lowering access 
Facilities provided funding based on 
performance against indicators. Overall 
satisfaction with payments. However, 
interviews suggest some problems at 
individual provider level, which may have 
consequences for quality of care: "50% of 
health workers considered P4P a control 
mechanism than as a supportive system. 
Only 24% believed that P4P had improved 
the management, and 32% did not think it 
was useful. In addition, 64% of staff felt that 
management support to their professional, 
personal and psychological needs was 
insufficient. With only 1/3rd of all positions 
within the Rwandan health sector actually 
filled, the P4P approach was frequently 
described as putting additional stress on a 
system already overstretched. 72% per cent 
of medical staff reported to regularly work 
supplementary hours and to feel constantly 
tired because of the workload" (Kalk et al. 
2010). The caveat in these qualitative results 
is the small sample which is restricted to one 
district hospital.  
In the qualitative work, two 
phenomena described: (1) Gaming of 
the system, with providers focusing on 
producing results against indicators as 
opposed to providing needed care. 
Interviews seem to suggest that long 
term care is often neglected, and other 
RH related issues such as morbidity 
ignored, because they are not part of 
the incentives/indicators package. (2) 
Crowding out, as intrinsic motivation to 
help others is replaced by extrinsic 
motivation associated with incentives. 
Also, intermediate indicators may not 
necessarily be appropriate for the 
outcome measured. 
Basinga et al 
2011; 
Basinga et 
al. 2010; 
Sekabaraga 
et al  2011; 
Kalk et al 
2010 
Performance-
based 
Financing in 
the 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo (DRC) 
Patient out of pocket payments 
increased 45% in treatment 
group between 2005 and 2008. 
The annual per capita revenues 
from patient user fees increased 
by 25 percent between 2005 and 
2008 
The increase in health spending did not 
affect the poorest 25% of the 
households in the participating 
districts. HH survey shows that health 
spending in this group declined by 
14%, while that of the relatively 
wealthy proportion of the sample 
increased. 
Not presented Not presented  Soeters et 
al. 2011 
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Name of 
programme 
EVIDENCE OF IMPACT ON: Authors 
Patient payments Equity Provider motivation 
Unintended consequences/ comments 
on results 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Burundi 
No information given No information given Pilot results indicate that staffs were 
retained in PBF facilities, and staffs from 
other areas were migrating into the health 
facilities in PBF zones, attracted by the 
incentives. Involvement in developing 
business plans for health facilities also seems 
to have had a positive effect on provider 
motivation 
No information given Busogoro & 
Beith 2010; 
Toonen et 
al. 2009 
Pay for 
Performance 
in Tanzania 
No information given No information given The fact that the contracts were signed 
between Cordaid and the diocese, albeit 
maintaining the purchaser-provider split 
essential for PBF, proved to be a major 
disadvantage in instilling responsibility for 
results and ownership of the performance 
indicators at health facility level who were 
often not involved or aware of contract 
negotiations and agreements but responsible 
for its results. The health facilities managers 
highlighted dissatisfaction with several of the 
indicators selected by Cordaid and the 
corresponding targets set. Overall staff 
satisfaction was found to be similar across 
PBF and non-PBF facilities. Intrinsic 
motivation factors emerged as most 
important 
P4P related drugs are 
dispensed/managed differently or 
sparingly to avoid stock-outs. Authors 
comment that it may cause focus on 
curative care, as there were no 
preventive indicators or indicators 
linked to quality of care 
Canavan & 
Swai 2008 
Performance 
based 
contracting 
in Uganda 
Based on exit polls, payments 
were perceived to increase 
(worsen) in the bonus group 
compared to control 
The wealth index of clients treated by 
the PNFP bonus group increased 
indicating that they were serving 
wealthier clients compared to the 
control group 
Autonomy in financial decision making 
appears to have had a positive influence on 
service provision.  
The experiment was unable to improve 
performance. This may have been due 
to design of scheme (small bonus size), 
poor information management systems 
which were not improved, and a 
movement from PNFPs to public sector 
of health workers which affected the 
capacity of PNFP missions (external 
environment influences) 
Morgan 
2010 
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Name of 
programme 
EVIDENCE OF IMPACT ON: Authors 
Patient payments Equity Provider motivation 
Unintended consequences/ comments 
on results 
Performance 
based 
Contracting 
Pilot, 
Nicaragua 
No information given No information given No information given There is no incentive to perform better 
once the 100% threshold for bonus is 
reached.  
Jack 2003 
Pay for 
Performance 
Pilot in 
Zambia 
No information given Not established, but authors note that 
no emphasis within PBF scheme on 
pro-poor measures (e.g. no focus on 
remote areas, which are more in need) 
The expenditure ceilings set by Cordaid (40-
60% for staff motivation, 20-30% for 
equipment and medical supplies, 20-30% for 
infrastructure and 10-30% for running costs) 
were found to confine health managers 
autonomy in decision making to improve 
performance.  Increase in workload is not 
accompanied with an increase in staffing. 
Increasing the inpatient turnover rate 
especially appeared questionable for 
health centres which are to focus 
mainly on preventative and promotive 
health care; managers felt it led to a 
neglect of PHC. TB detection rates were 
investigated to see if they fell in PBF 
areas - there was no clear pattern. 
Various confounding factors, such as 
higher revenues in mission sector and 
removal of user fees in 2006.  
 
 
Collins & 
Vergeer 
2008 
Performance-
based Grants 
for 
Reproductive 
Health in the 
Philippines 
(PBG1) 
No information given No information given No information given These are not consequences, but design 
and communication issues:  health 
workers under PBG 1 were not aware of 
the bonus in many cases. PBG 1 also 
had issues with delay in release of 
funds.  
 
 
WHO 2011 
PAYMENTS TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS 
Performance-
based Grants 
for 
Reproductive 
Health in the 
Philippines 
(PBG2) 
No information given No information given PBG 2 incentive of Peso 200 not enough to 
encourage TBAs to send women to facilities 
(they can earn between 1000 and 1500 pesos 
for home births). Providers and mothers also 
reported delays in payments 
No information given WHO 2011 
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Table 5 Cost and sustainability of P4P schemes 
Programme Overall cost of scheme Assessment of cost-efficiency Sustainability Authors 
PAYMENTS TO GOVERNMENTS 
Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
Initiated in 2001 with US$ 1 billion in 
pledges. The Global Fund is estimated to 
have contributed to the rapid expansion 
of programming addressing HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria through more 
than 550 grants, and it is estimated that 
significant amounts of its grants are 
allocated to key health systems elements 
(35% of about US$4 billion of approved 
financing by 2008) 
In the 18 evaluation countries for 
HIV, it was estimated that HIV 
funding increased rapidly with 18% 
of the funding coming from the 
Global Fund. The evaluation states 
that "increased funding has led to 
better access to care, including rapid 
increases in intervention uptake and 
notable survival benefits through 
ARV treatment".  
The GFATM has received significant support 
from donors and is expected to be sustained in 
the near future. However, a fall in pledges in 
2011 reflects the difficult international 
economic climate. 
Macro International 2009 
GAVI HSS Window Since inception in 2005 US$ 524 million 
committed to 44 countries and disbursed 
US$ 255 million to 36 countries. 
No information given GAVI is a global alliance of donors including the 
World Bank, UNICEF, WHO, Gates Foundation 
and others. Its main focus is on immunizations 
and vaccinations. HSS was introduced as a 
separate window of funding in 2005 and has 
seen rapid scale up. There is support for the 
alliance to continue its functions since the 
additional funding has been useful in 
supporting countries for providing better 
services related to immunizations and vaccines. 
HLSP 2009; 
www.gavialliance.org; Chee 
2007 
PAYMENTS TO MID LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS 
Plan Nacer in 
Argentina 
Not mentioned. However, payment to 
providers is costed at $10 per person per 
month.  
No information given This is a national programme, funded by the 
World Bank. Continuity of funding from the 
Bank is contingent on meeting specific criteria 
in the implementation of Plan Nacer.  
Niamoli & Vergeer 2010; 
Eichler & Glassman 2008 
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Programme Overall cost of scheme Assessment of cost-efficiency Sustainability Authors 
Contracting of 
Health Services Pilot 
Project, Cambodia 
Total spending was $2.56 per capita in 
contracting in districts, 61% higher than 
the $1.59 per capita spent in comparison 
districts. Contracting out districts spent 
$2.94 per capita, 85% higher than 
comparison (significant difference). 
There are no significant changes in total 
health spending.  
No information given This was a pilot programme, initiated in mid 
1999 and lasted through 2003 
Bloom et al. 2007 
Performance-based 
contracting in the 
DRC 
US$ 150 million provided through IDA for 
this phase (2008 onwards, when project 
expanded to 89 zones) 
No information given Ongoing, but sustainability not assessed Johannes et al. 2008 
Paying NGOs for 
performance in 
Afghanistan 
US$ 155 million (World Bank, USAID and 
European commission combined) 
No information given The Government is committed to an output-
based approach and the three main actors - 
World Bank, USAID, and European Commission 
- are interested in continuing with it for the 
foreseeable future.  
Sondorp et al. 2009 
PAYMENTS TO FACILITIES 
Pay for Performance 
in Rwanda 
The P4P budget in Rwanda grew from 
US$ 200,000 in 2002 to US$ 9.3 million in 
2007. Transfers from the centre to the 
districts for provision of health services 
increased from RwF 1.3 billion in 2005, 
to RwF 7.1 billion in 2006 and RwF 9.7 
billion in 2007. In 2007, the Treasury 
transferred US$ 1.8 per capita for 
provision of basic health services to the 
districts.  
No information given The first pilots were launched in 2002. By 2005, 
the Government of Rwanda had committed to 
scale up, which began nationally in 2005-06. 
There is considerable buy-in to the programme 
from the Government and donors. The 
programme is funded through the World Bank's 
RBF programme, GFATM and bilateral donors as 
well as the government's budget. "In 2005, 
donor per capita expenditures were estimated 
at US$15 out of a total of US$34, about half of 
which came through earmarked financing for 
HIV/AIDS (World Bank and MOH Rwanda 2010) 
and the other half through budget support".  
Basinga et al 2011; Basinga et 
al. 2010; Sekabaraga et al  
2011; Kalk et al 2010 
PAYMENTS TO FACILITIES 
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Programme Overall cost of scheme Assessment of cost-efficiency Sustainability Authors 
Performance-based 
Financing in the 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) 
Budget was $2 per person per year, plus 
$0.4 for administration and overheads. 
No information on overall expenditure 
was given. However, for the treatment 
group the average monthly revenue per 
capita was calculated at $1.04 compared 
to $0.45 in the control health centres. 
No information given There is reported to be strong buy-in from the 
Government. However, this was externally 
funded, and managed by CORDAID. 
Soeters et al. 2011; Soeters & 
Kiwanuka, 2008 
Pay for Performance 
in Burundi 
Overall cost not provided. However, the 
GoB, with support from the World Bank, 
will cover US$ 67 million for the 
programme.  
No information given Strong Government commitment for scale up. 
Donor support also has provided a boost to the 
programme (pilot and then scale up), with the 
Dutch government and the EU having 
supported HealthNet TPO and Cordaid (pilot on 
P4P). During scale up, others such as the Swiss 
and Belgian Development Cooperation 
Agencies, GAVI Alliance, and the World Bank 
have become increasingly involved as 
financiers. It is likely that the programme will be 
sustained 
Busogoro & Beith 2010 
Pay for Performance 
in Tanzania 
(CORDAID) 
Budget set at 0.5 Euros per capita; 
amounted to 8% of facility income on 
average. 
No information given Externally funded pilot. However, there is 
strong support for performance based financing 
in the health sector, especially with the aim of 
achieving the MDGs 4 and 5.  
Canavan & Swai 2008 
Performance based 
contracting in 
Uganda 
US$ 300,000 total budget No information given The programme was supported by World Bank, 
CIDA, USAID. Results were not positive because 
of which interest has waned. There is work 
underway to revive interest in the intervention.  
Morgan 2010 
Performance based 
Contracting Pilot, 
Nicaragua 
No information given No information given This was a pilot - however generally there is 
support for this. Both the World Bank and IADB 
support the country's Health Sector Strategy 
which aims to improve administration, financing 
and management. 
Jack 2003 
Pay for Performance 
Pilot in Zambia 
Budget set at 0.5 Euros per capita. 
Amounted to 17% of facility revenue. 
Amounts small relative to salaries (but 
variable by facility).  
No information given Pilot project - not scaled up. Collins & Vergeer 2008 
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Programme Overall cost of scheme Assessment of cost-efficiency Sustainability Authors 
Performance-based 
Grants for 
Reproductive Health 
in the Philippines 
(PBG1) 
No information given No information given PBG has government interest for learning from 
and improving interventions like it. How this 
materialises remains to be seen.  
WHO 2011 
PAYMENTS TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS 
Pay for 
Performance, 
Tanzania 
US$ 29 million in the first year budgeted 
for performance incentives  
No information given The programme has government interest, but 
the initial attempt could not be sustained: the 
programme was launched nationally, but there 
were implementation problems: (i) government 
did not want to roll out the programme 
gradually, instead implemented it 
simultaneously across the country; (ii) there 
was not adequate time for training and 
communicating the programme to the facilities 
and health workers; (iii) donors did not have 
confidence in the programme and strongly 
favored a roll out and refused to pay for health 
workers' bonuses. As of 2010, there was still 
strong government interest in the programme, 
and it had initiated new discussions with donors 
on how to package and roll out the programme.  
Morgan & Eichler, 2009 
Performance-based 
Grants for 
Reproductive Health 
in the Philippines 
(PBG2) 
No information given No information given PBG has government interest for learning from 
and improving interventions like it.  
WHO 2011 
 
